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PARTIES
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(1) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure,
appellees National Railroad Passenger Corporation and Southern Pacific
Transportation Company advise the Court that all parties to this action are set forth in
the caption. However, since the filing of this action, appellees understand that
appellant Carma Larrabee now is deceased, and appellee Southern Pacific
Transportation Company has been acquired by Union Pacific Railroad Company.
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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This Court has jurisdiction of this appeal pursuant to UTAH C O D E A N N . § 78-2a3(2)0(1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW
Appellees National Railroad Passenger Corporation ("Amtrak") and Southern
Pacific Transportation Company ("SP")(Amtrak and SP also are collectively referred to
herein as "Defendants") accept Plaintiffs' statement of issues, noting that Plaintiffs have
not addressed SP's alleged breach of duties to alter the design in which the public road
intersected its track or to maintain its right of way. Summary judgment was granted on
these claims, and by not raising them in their brief, this Court is given no reason to
reverse and remand the trial court's ruling regarding them as Plaintiffs request with
respect to the other claims they do address in their brief. Thus, this appeal, as to these
Defendants, focuses solely on the Plaintiffs' claims that Defendants allegedly breached
duties to 1) upgrade motor vehicle traffic warning devices at the subject crossing, 2)
operate the train at some unspecified lower speed through the subject crossing, 3)
brake the train at some unspecified sooner time simply because of the presence of
automobiles near the subject crossing, and 4) sound the train's horn differently than it
was sounded. Summary judgment for Defendants also was granted on each of these
four claims which involve the issues of whether legal duties existed to do as Plaintiffs
allege in light of the admissible evidence of record. Defendants, therefore, agree that a
correction of error standard of review is to be applied to these four legal issues.
A fifth issue raised on appeal, pertaining to these Defendants, is whether certain
affidavits submitted by Plaintiffs were properly stricken by the trial court. Many grounds
were raised by Defendants on which the trial court relied in deciding to strike the
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-1-

affidavits at issue. Thus, there was a reasonable basis for the trial court's decision, and
that decision is to be reviewed on appeal pursuant to an abuse of discretion/harmful
error standard of review. State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939-40 n.5 (Utah 1994);
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993); Kunzlerv. O'Dell, 855
P.2d 270, 275 (Utah App. 1993). Plaintiffs' reliance on GNS Partnership v. Fullmer,
873 P.2d 1157 (Utah App. 1994) as support for a correction of error standard is
erroneous. That court did not hold that a correction of error standard was to be applied.
It did not address the appropriate standard of review. It did uphold the trial court's
decisions on motions to strike affidavits pertaining to a motion for summary judgment
after finding that there were reasonable bases for its rulings which is in essence an
abuse of discretion review.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Pursuant to Rule 24(a)(6) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the
following statutes, rules and regulations are determinative of this appeal and are
included in the addendum:

1.

49 U.S.C. §§ 20101; 20106; 20153

2.

49 C.F.R. §213.9

3.

UTAH C O D E A N N . §§ 41-6-27; 41-6-28; 41-6-93; 41-6-95(1); 54-4-15
through 54-4-15.4

4.

Utah Administrative Code, R930-5-2; R930-5-4(B)(1)
STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Plaintiffs allege that three of their teenage children, while driving together late on
New Year's Eve, December 31, 1995, and in route to a party with other friends, were
killed as a result of Defendants' purported negligence when the car they were in was
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

brought to a stop at a stop sign before the subject crossing, and then suddenly driven in
front of an Amtrak train just as the train was entering the crossing thereby causing an
inevitable collision. (R. 3-5.)
After extensive discovery, Defendants moved for summary judgment on all of
Plaintiffs'theories of negligence. (R. 1429-1911,1 1052-95.) In the process of briefing
that motion, Defendants also filed a motion to strike certain of the affidavits Plaintiffs
filed in opposition to summary judgment. (R. 1165-98, 1222-28.) The trial court
ultimately granted Defendants' motions (R. 1258-85, 1307-09) and entered judgment
for Defendants (R. 1323-25). Plaintiffs now appeal against these Defendants four of
the theories of liability they raised below and on which summary judgment for
Defendants was granted. (Applt. Brief at 1-2.) Plaintiffs also appeal the trial court's
granting of Defendants' motion to strike certain of the affidavits they filed with the trial
court. (Id. at 3.) This brief will address those issues now raised by Plaintiffs.
In addition, one aspect of Defendants' motion for summary judgment was not
ruled on below, ostensibly because it became moot upon the trial court's ruling against
Plaintiffs on the purported legal duties asserted by Plaintiffs. This additional issue
pertains to the negligence of the driver who drove the car the decedents were in from its
stopped position at the stop sign onto the track in front of the train just as the train was
entering the crossing. Such negligence was the sole proximate cause of the accident
and therefore bars Plaintiffs' right to recover regardless of the outcome of any of the
other issues raised by Plaintiffs. This is a legal issue pertaining to the issues raised by
Plaintiffs on appeal that this Court can rule on as a matter of law, if necessary.

1

The original in the record was mixed up (see R. 210-30, 549-68, 840-52); thus, by stipulation of the
parties, a complete copy, in proper order, has been added at R. 1429 through 1911.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Therefore, Defendants also will address this issue which also precludes the remanding
of all or any issue for trial as Plaintiffs request.
A. The Accident Site
The collision occurred where 10200 South in South Jordan crosses over SP's
main line track just west of Interstate 1-15. A frontage road, 300 West, also parallels the
track to the west between 10600 South and 10200 South. At 10200 South, 300 West
makes an "S" turn by turning right (or east), crosses over the track, and then turns left
(or north) and continues to run parallel to the track but on the east side. (R. 1489.) A
stop sign at the crossing requires motorists to stop before attempting to cross over the
track. (R. 1532-33.)
There is no evidence in this case that any existing condition of SP's track or right
of way prevented the decedents, and particularly the driver of the automobile they were
in, Brent Larrabee, from knowing there was a railroad crossing and seeing the
approaching Amtrak train while stopped at the stop sign and before Larrabee attempted
to drive over the track in front of it. (Id.] R. 1497-98.)
The decedents' friends, who were there that night, have testified that there were
no obstructions between the railroad track and 300 West from 10600 South to 10200
South where the crossing is located. (R. 1575-76, 1738-40, 1628-29, 1593, 1857-58,
1548.) In fact, the track is higher in elevation than the public road, so that motorists
clearly are aware of the existence of the track before driving onto it. (R. 1533, 1498 flj
9).) From the stop sign on the west side of the crossing, there was a clear,
unobstructed view to the south, the direction from which the Amtrak train was traveling,
and the railroad track to the south is straight making it possible for a person at the stop
sign to see a train for over one-half mile away. (R. 1533, 1497 flj 7).)
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Also, at the time of the subject accident, a stop sign, crossbucks, and advance
stop and railroad crossing signs were posted for motorists traveling from either direction
advising them of the existence of the stop sign, track and intersecting road. (R. 153033, 1498 flj 8).) The decedents' friends and the investigating police officer have
testified that these warning signs were in place and visible the night of the collision. (R.
1751-53, 1615-16, 1623, 1856-57, 1544-45, 1516, 1518-33.) Nevertheless, visibility
actually is immaterial inasmuch as Larrabee in fact stopped perpendicular to the
crossing. (R. 1532-33, 1571, 1746-47, 1759, 1763, 1621-23, 1784, 1517.)
B.

The History of Crossing Protection

The obvious dangers associated with intersecting railroad tracks and roads has
become an increasing problem that for decades has had the attention of our
government, as evidenced by federal regulators in the 1960's who queried:
For practical reasons costs associated with crossing safety
improvements should be borne by public funds as . . . it is
the increasing highway traffic that is the controlling element
in accident exposure at these crossings.
In the past it was the railroad's responsibility for protection of
the public at grade crossings. This responsibility has now
shifted. Now it is the highway, not the railroad, and the
motor vehicle, not the train, which creates the hazard and
must be primarily responsible for its removal. Railroads
were in existence long before the problem presented itself
and if the increasing seriousness is a result of the increasing
development of highways for public use, why should not the
cost of grade crossing protection be assessed to the public?
(Prevention of Rail-Highway Grade Crossing Accidents Involving Railway Trains and
Motor Vehicles, Interstate Commerce Commission, 322 I.C.C. 1 (1964).)
In 1970, the Secretary of Transportation was directed by Congress to study and
develop solutions to safety problems posed at grade crossings. (CSX Transp., Inc. v.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 661-62 (1993) (citing 45 U.S.C. §§ 421 and 433).) In 1971
and 1972, the Secretary duly reported to Congress on the possible solutions to
problems at grade crossings. (Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 662-63 n.3 (citing U.S. Dept. of
Transportation, Railroad-Highway Safety, Part I: A Comprehensive Statement of the
Problem (1971); U.S. Dept. of Transportation, Railroad-Highway Safety, Part II:
Recommendations for Resolving the Problems (1972)).) The Highway Safety Act of
1973 was Congress' response, wherein Congress made federal funds available to the
States for their use in improving grade crossings for which the States were required to
"conduct and systematically maintain a survey of all highways to identify those railroad
crossings, which may require separation, relocation, or protective devices, and establish
and implement a schedule of projects for this purpose," and States also were required
to adhere to the regulations promulgated by the Secretary under the Federal Railroad
Safety Act of 1970 (45 U.S.C. §§ 421 etseq.) and the Highway Safety Act of 1973 (23
U.S.C. §§ 130 etseq.). (Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 663.)
Under this authority from Congress, the Secretary promulgated regulations
requiring States, who chose to take advantage of federal funds, to have programs to
systematically identify hazardous crossings and to eliminate those hazards.
(Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 665-66 (citing 23 C.F.R. Pt. 1204.4, Highway Safety Program
Guideline No. 12(G)); 23 C.F.R. Pt. 924 and Pt. 646.) In addition, States were
restricted by regulations regarding the particular warning devices that can be installed.
For all projects, regardless of federal funding, States must employ devices that conform
to standards set out in the Federal Highway Administration's ("FHWA's") Manual on
Uniform Control Devices for Streets and Highways ("MUTCD"). For projects where
federal-aid funds are
used, improvement of grade crossings must either include an
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automatic gate and flashing light signals as part of the improvement or receive FHWA
approval. (Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 666 and 670-71 (citing 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)).)
In Utah at this time in the early 1970's, and indeed since 1917, the Utah Public
Service Commission ("PSC") already had been vested with the power and the
jurisdiction "to supervise and regulate" public utilities which included railroads as
common carriers. (UTAH CODE A N N . §§ 54-2-1(28), 54-4-1 and 54-4-31 (1953, as
amended).) Thus, as set forth in UTAH C O D E A N N . § 54-4-15 (1953, as amended), the
PSC was given the right to regulate intersecting public roads and tracks, and in doing
so, the PSC was granted "the exclusive power to determine and prescribe the manner.
. . and the terms of installation, operation, maintenance, use and protection of each
crossing . . .." (Emphasis added.) (See Denver & Rio Grande W. R.R. v. Public Service
Commission, 51 Utah 623, 172 P. 479, 480 (1918)(construing these sections, the Utah
Supreme Court stated: "Since the act, in language so plain that it will admit of but one
construction, confers on the commission the exclusive power to determine and
prescribe the manner, and the terms upon which railroad companies may construct,
maintain, and operate railroad tracks across public roads, highways, and streets within
the state . . ..")
In 1973, apparently in response to the federal law and regulations discussed
above, the Utah Legislature enacted UTAH C O D E A N N . §§ 54-4-15.1 through 54-4-15.4
which vested the PSC with the responsibility to not only "determine" and "prescribe"
crossing protection, which responsibility it already had, but also to "provide for the
installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and improving of automatic and other safety
appliances, signals or devices at grade crossings or public highways or roads over the
tracks of any railroad . . . in the state." (UTAH C O D E A N N . § 54-4-15.1.) The PSC was
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directed to use federal funds to pay for "the installation, maintenance, reconstruction or
improvement of any signals or devices described in Section 54-4-15.1." (Id. § 54-415.2.) Therefore, in 1973, the power and jurisdiction to provide and install crossing
protection rested solely with the PSC pursuant to statutory law. (L. 1973, ch. 118,
Sec.l)
^

.

In 1975, the Utah Legislature enacted the Department of Transportation Act

thereby creating the Utah Department of Transportation ("UDOT"). (UTAH C O D E A N N .
§§ 63-49-1 et seq.) At the same time, the Utah Legislature amended Section 54-4-15
and Section 54-4-15.1 to give UDOT jurisdiction over providing and installing crossing
protection in Utah in accordance with federal law and regulations, subject only to the
PSC's authority to resolve disputes arising out of UDOT's exercise of its authority (UTAH
CODE ANN.

§ 54-4-15(4)). (L 1975 (1st S.S.), ch. 9, Sec.18.)

UDOT subsequently has enacted regulations that provide that "prior to the
initiation of actual construction of a project, an agreement between UDOT and the
railroad company involved shall be prepared in accordance with" specified FHWA
provisions. (Utah Administrative Code, R930-5-2 (April 1, 1996).) Thus, railroads do
the actual construction but only under the authority granted by and pursuant to the
requirements prescribed by UDOT. UDOT also has promulgated the rule that "projects
for grade crossing improvements . . . are deemed to be of no ascertainable benefit to
the railroads, and there shall be no required railroad share of the costs." (Id., R930-54(B)(1) (emphasis added).) However, railroads can, and often do, share in costs if they
so desire.
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The Utah Legislature also has determined that it is unlawful for any person, with
no exclusion for railroads, to unilaterally "place, maintain, or display . . . any
unauthorized sign, signal, light, marking or device which purports to be or is an imitation
of or resembles an official traffic-control device or railroad sign or signal" that is
intended to "direct the movement of vehicular traffic," or to "remove any official trafficcontrol device or any railroad sign or signal." (UTAH C O D E ANN. §§ 41-6-27 and 28.)
Thus, defendants are prohibited from unilaterally changing motor vehicle warning
devices at crossings which is UDOTs responsibility. See also Duncan v. Union Pac.
R.R, 790 P.2d 595 (Utah App. 1990), affd, 842 P.2d 832 (1992). All of these
statements of law are significant here because without citing any legal authority
Plaintiffs state as fact that Defendants "could have upgraded the Crossing . . . at their
own volition." (Applt. Brief at 13, U 19.) This Court, not Plaintiffs, is the authority on
what the law actually allows and more importantly what it imposes as an affirmative
legal duty.
With respect to what UDOT had been able to do in approximately two decades
with its sole authority to provide and install crossing protection, the Utah Supreme Court
summarized, in 1992, the facts as follows:
Active warning devices are funded 90 percent from federal
funds and 10 percent from the entity with jurisdiction over
the highway in question. Federal funding is generally
available only for eight to ten projects in Utah each year.
UDOT has developed and uses a hazard index rating
approved by the Federal Highway Administration as one
means of determining the priority of crossings for upgrading
the adequacy of warning devices presently in place.
UDOTs team, with the railroad and local government
representatives, makes on-site inspections of crossings
throughout the state, using the hazard index. Priorities are
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then established, based on the degree of hazard found at
the crossings surveyed.
(Duncan, 842 P.2d at 834.)
On September 7, 1993, in the exercise of its authority, UDOT issued a letter to
all cities stating:
In accordance with Section 54-4-15 of the UTAH
CODE, the Utah Department of Transportation has the
responsibility for all railroad crossings in Utah.
*

•

*

Whenever a city or county plans to upgrade local
roadways or issue building permits for industries or
developers that impact public railroad crossings, UDOT must
approve the plans before railroad companies can make any
of the changes.
•

*

*

In the State of Utah there are 2300 railroad crossings
(1368 Public and 932 Private). It is therefore important that
UDOT be contacted early in the planning process so reviews
can be scheduled and input given, before the cities and
counties approve the plans. This also gives the railroad
companies time to react, order materials and schedule the
work, which can take about 15 to 18 months.
Whenever changes are requested at a crossing, the
local agency, developer or industry making the changes
must bear the costs. When railroad materials are required
at crossings, they do not come cheap. Generally, railroad
crossing materials cost about $40,000 and automatic
flashing light signals and gates about $125,000 per crossing.
UDOT only receives enough Federal funds for the
upgrading of about 5 crossings a year. At that rate, it would
take over 200 years to upgrade all of the existing public
crossings.
The railroad crossings that are upgraded with federal
funds are determined by the use of a "High Accident
Prediction Formula". UDOT cannot randomly select any
crossing desired by special interest groups.
Currently, there is a national trend being formulated
by the Federal Department of Transportation to close 25% of
the existing
railroad crossings in the United States by the
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year 2000. Therefore, in the future, if the Cities or Counties
upgrade their master plans for their road systems and can
eliminate any of their public or private at-grade
highway/railway crossings, federal funds can be used to
upgrade nearby crossings that will handle the increased
traffic. Railroad companies will also participate in the
upgrade. It is also recommended that when new crossings
are requested by either the cities or the counties, they
should review their existing crossings and see if roads can
be realigned to eliminate other crossings.
There are several other problems that UDOT's
Surveillance Teams are finding, that are the local agency's
responsibility, which are being neglected. Cities and
counties are responsible for the installation of the Railroad
Painted Pavement Messages and Advance Warning Signs
on the approaches to the railroad crossings on their local
street systems. Information on the types of signs and the
location of the signs and pavement messages can be found
[sic] Section VIII of the "Manual of Uniform Traffic Control
Devices" (MUTCD.)
(R. 1769-71.)
UDOT's surveillance team indeed did inspect the subject crossing of 10200
South over SP's main line track and was aware of the existing stop signs, crossbucks
and advance warning signs that were in place before the collision in December 1995,
and UDOT ranked this crossing with others in the state. (R. 1632-38, 1648-50, 182627, 1683-84, 1689, 1767-68.) Although UDOT was fully aware of the nature of this
public crossing, there is no evidence that UDOT contracted with SP or anyone else,
prior to the subject collision, for the installation of any gates, flashing lights or other type
of advance warning signs or crossing protection to replace the stop signs and other
warning signs already in existence prior to the collision. In fact, instead of upgrading
the existing crossing protection, South Jordan ultimately wanted to take out 10200
South as development progressed so that it would not cross over the track, and UDOT
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agreed to the ultimate elimination of this crossing. (R. 1642-47, 1651-58, 1797-1825,

1828-40, 1662-68, 1670-82, 1685-88, 1692-1718, 1551-63, 1768.)
It is noteworthy that this federal program of shifting responsibility and giving
public funds to the States to systematically prioritize and upgrade the most dangerous
crossings first, in which Utah participates and even has accepted full responsibility for
all upgrading, has proven successful as demonstrated in the USDOT's 1996 Annual
Report on Highway Safety Improvement Programs (FHWA-SA-96-040, April, 1996),
which states:
The Rail-Highway Crossings Program continues to show the
greatest percentage of accident rate reductions. Fatal,
nonfatal-injury and combined fatal-plus-nonfatal-injury
accident rates have been reduced by 87, 64 and 68 percent,
respectively . . . . Based on evaluations of improvements
provided by the states, the Rail-Highway Crossings Program
has helped to prevent more than 8,500 fatalities and 38,900
nonfatal injuries since 1974.
(Id, at IV-5.) The Federal Railroad Administration continues to report, as of February 7,
2000, that there is a steady decline in accidents at grade crossings. (See Federal
Railroad Administration Office of Safety Analysis (as of modified Feb. 27, 2000)
(http://safety data.fra.dot.gov/officeofsafety) (for 1998, when compared with 1997,
highway-rail crossing incidents were down 9.2%, highway-rail crossing incidents per
million train miles were down 10.1%, and highway-rail crossing fatalities were down
6.5%).)
C. The Collision
Plaintiffs admitted, or at least had no evidence to refute, Amtrak's train was
traveling immediately before the application of the emergency brakes no faster than 68
mph which is approximately 100 feet per second. (R. 1480, 1910, 1610, 1792-94,
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1498-99, 1492-93.)2 The speed limit for passenger trains in the subject area has been
established by federal regulators to be 80 mph. (R. 1497; 49 C.F.R. § 213.9 (1995).)
As the Amtrak train was approaching the subject crossing from the south, there
were three cars (a Honda, a Tempo and a Jeep, in which decedents' and seven other
teenagers were traveling together to a New Year's Eve party) on 300 West also
approaching the crossing from the south. (R. 1566-67, 1613-14, 1855, 1543.) The first
of the three cars, the Honda, had its windows up and the radio playing, and the three
teenagers in that car were talking as the Honda was driven toward the crossing. (R.
1859, 1861, 1846, 1850, 1852, 1546.) The second car, the Tempo, was being driven
by Larrabee and contained the three decedents; it too had a radio/CD stereo system
that Larrabee usually had on. (R. 1848-49.) The third car, the Jeep, also was being
driven with its windows up and the radio playing, and the four teenagers in that car also
were talking as the Jeep was driven north on 300 West toward the crossing. (R. 1575,
1613.)
The Honda, which was the lead vehicle, was brought to at least a rolling stop at
the stop sign just west of the crossing and then it was driven across the track in front of
the approaching train and it safely made it to the other side of the track. (R. 1860-61,
1776-81, 1783, 1757-58.) The driver of the Honda claims not to have seen the train
until she was on the crossing, and obviously at that time the Tempo had not yet left the
stop sign inasmuch as Plaintiffs contend the Tempo was stopped there for three
seconds after it pulled up to the stop sign.

This Court can take judicial notice of the fact that a mile is 5,280 feet, and that at 68 mph an object
would travel 99.75 feet each second (5,280 x 68 = 359,040; 359,040 - 3600 (seconds in each hour) =
99.73).
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It is undisputed that the Tempo, occupied by the decedents, came to a complete
stop at the stop sign before the crossing. (R. 1571, 1746-47, 1759, 1763, 1621-23,
1784, 1517.) However, when the Amtrak train was 50 feet to 300 feet (approximately Yi
second to 3 seconds at 68 mph) from the crossing, Larrabee "slowly" drove the Tempo
onto the track in front of the train and his car was hit broadside killing all three of the
occupants. (R. 1574, 1578, 1747-48, 1764, 1624-25, 1589, 1784.)
Amtrak's train crew was aware of the three cars and concerned about the
possibility that drivers of those cars might put themselves in danger, but they did not
know nor could they know that any of the drivers would put themselves in harm's way
and particularly that the driver of the Tempo would not stop and remain stopped at the
stop sign on the west side of the crossing. (R. 1608-09, 1780-82.) Ms. Hill, the driver
of the Jeep behind the Tempo, testified that she was first concerned about the Tempo
being hit when she saw it start moving from the stop sign, and prior to that she did not
think there would be an accident. (R. 1572-73, 1579-80.) Mr. Sant, a passenger in the
Jeep who also was able to see the tragedy unfold, also testified that he did not have
any reason to suspect the Tempo would be driven up onto the track in front of the train.
(R. 1749-50.) McCullough, another passenger in the Jeep, testified that the Tempo,
before it moved, remained stopped at the stop sign for seconds. (R. 1623.)
It is undisputable that with reasonable effort the approaching train could be seen
before it reached the crossing. It obviously was very close to the crossing. There were
no obstructions. The lead locomotive's headlight was on bright. (R. 1786-89.) The
driver of the Honda saw the train from the crossing. (R. 1860-64.) Passengers in the
Jeep also saw the train from 300 West. (R. 1743-44, 1756, 1760-62, 1617-20, 158384, 1586, 1590.) One of the passengers in the Jeep, who saw what happened, testified
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that there were no obstructions to seeing the train and she has no explanation for why
the decedents presumably did not know there was a train. (R. 1593-98.)

<

In addition to being visible, the Amtrak train also sounded its horn prior to the
collision and with reasonable effort the horn could be heard since others heard it. (R.
i

1774-75, 1780-82, 1790-91, 1603-07.) The horn had been placed in an automatic
sequence mode, which blows a specific pattern over and over and not one continuous
sound, for over one-quarter mile before the crossing, (id.) Some of the decedents'
friends heard the horn as the train was approaching the crossing prior to the collision.
Ms. Hill heard the horn when she was driving her Jeep on 300 West and was about half
way between 10600 South and 10200 South, and she recalls hearing it again about one

{

second before the collision (R. 1568-70, 1577,) Mr. Sant also heard the horn when he
was in the jeep while it was traveling north on 300 West. (R. 1741-42, 1745, 1754-55,
1762.) Others do not remember hearing the horn until just before impact when the
collision was eminent. (R. 1626-27.) Despite the positive recollections of the
decedents' friends, yet some of their friends do not recall hearing any horn at all at any

<

time. (R. 1585, 1587-88, 1591-92, 1599-1600, 1862, 1864, 1547.) In addition to the
varying recollections of decedents' friends, an independent witness, who was some
distance to the north of the crossing and in a position where he could not see what was
happening, heard the train's horn sounding. (R. 1536-40.)
In support of all this positive evidence of subjectively having heard the horn at
various times as it automatically went through its pattern, the lead locomotive also was
equipped with a computerized event recording device that electronically recorded the
objective fact that the horn indeed was in automatic sequence mode for approximately
40 continuous seconds before the emergency brakes were applied prior to the collision
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and it remained in operation until the train came to a stop. (R. 1721-35, 1492-93 (ffij 27), 1506-07 (ffll 3-5), 1498-99 (ffij 10-11).)
Obviously, trains cannot slow quickly, and in fact the subject train traveled
approximately one-third of a mile after the emergency brakes were applied, and after
colliding with the Tempo, before it was able to come to a stop. (R. 1518, 1497 (fflj 4-5),
1510 (H 2).) Nevertheless, when it became apparent to Amtrak's crew that the driver of
the Tempo was going to try to cross the track in front of the train, with insufficient time
to make it safely, the train was put into emergency braking. (R. 1784-85.)
To emphasize the fact that Amtrak could not have avoided the collision once it
became apparent that the Tempo would attempt to cross over the track in front of the
train, it can be assumed that the Tempo could have moved far enough across the track
to have avoided being hit if the train was delayed by only one second. This assumption
is very favorable to Plaintiffs and assumes the Tempo, which was hit broadside, had
only 15 feet more to travel before the rear of the Tempo cleared the right edge of the
locomotive and that the Tempo was going as fast as 10 mph. In other words, it would
take one second for the Tempo to move 15 feet at 10 mph. Obviously, it would take
more time if the Tempo had further to go and/or was going slower than 10 mph.
(Remember that the decedents' friends described the Tempo as moving "slowly," and
the Tempo was moving after having been at a complete stop at the track.)
Nevertheless, with this favorable assumption, in order to delay the train's arrival by this
one second, the emergency brakes on the train would have had to begin to apply about
nine seconds before impact and before the Tempo even reached the stop sign. (R.
1511-12 (fflj 5-7).) Thus, upon the undisputed facts of record, it is impossible to find
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that the Amtrak train could have been slowed enough to avoid the collision at the time
the Tempo began to move from the stop sign.
D.

No Genuine Issue of Material Fact Exists

Plaintiffs contend there are issues of fact as to whether the motor vehicle traffic
control devices were "visible the night of the Collision" or otherwise were adequate.
(Applt. Brief at 13, fl 20-21, and at 16, fl 26.) That contention is nonsensical inasmuch
as Larrabee obviously saw the stop sign before the crossing because the evidence is
unrefuted he stopped for up to three seconds before driving onto the track. Moreover,
even if the signs were not visible to himi, he stopped before the track and must have
known of the track. All of the decedents' friends knew there was a track. Finally, even
if one could speculate Larrabee was totally oblivious to his surroundings while stopping
and then driving onto the track in front of a train, Defendants had no duty to act so as to
improve the nature of the traffic control devices then employed and Larrabee alone had
the duty to exercise reasonable care in the operation of this Tempo at night. Thus, the
visibility of traffic control devices at night or their nature does not create a genuine issue
of material fact precluding judgment for Defendants.
Plaintiffs misstated the evidence in also contending that an issue of fact exists as
to whether the train could be seen by Larrabee while he was stopped at a perpendicular
angle to the track at the stop sign before he drove onto the track in front of the train.
Plaintiffs claim the occupants of the lead vehicle, the Honda, "could not see the train
until they were on the track." (Id. at 15, U 22.) In reality they testified they "did not" see
the train. There is no evidence that they "could not" have seen it, and the fact that they
did see it while they were on the track, before Larrabee drove his Tempo to the stop
sign and stopped for up to three seconds, during which time the train would have been
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getting closer and closer, undercuts any inference that Larrabee could not then have
seen the train before he left the stop sign and drove in front of the train just as it was
entering the crossing. Moreover, Plaintiffs rely on Larrabee's negligence in driving in
front of a train as evidence that the train could not be seen. Contrary to such
speculation, the evidence is unrefuted, as discussed above, that the train had its
headlight illuminated and that there were no obstructions to its very close approach on
a straight track no more than 90° to the south of the direction Larrabee was facing
where he was stopped at the stop sign. The evidence is undisputed that occupants in
the Jeep behind the Tempo saw the train before Larrabee drove in front of it. Finally,
even if the train was not seen by Larrabee that fact is not material to any of the legal
duties raised by Plaintiffs on this appeal. It only would be material to Defendants'
contentions herein that Larrabee's negligence is the cause of the collision as another
basis for why Defendants are entitled to summary judgment. Nevertheless, even as to
that issue, there is no genuine issue of material fact pertaining to whether the train
"could" have been seen.
Plaintiffs contend that it is disputed whether the Honda came to a complete stop
before crossing over the track. (Id. at 16, U 23.) It is not disputed that the Honda made
it safely across the track. It is immaterial whether or not the Honda stopped before
doing so. The Tempo, occupied by the decedents, clearly stopped after the Honda
safely made it across.
Plaintiffs contend that it is disputed whether the horn was blown before the
collision by referring to the few witnesses who, after witnessing their friends die before
their eyes, now do not recall having heard a horn. (Id. at U 24.) The evidence is
undisputed that those witnesses were in vehicles with the windows rolled up and music
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playing while talking with friends on the way to a New Year's Eve party. There is no
evidence that they were actively listening for a horn. Such evidence cannot
competently refute the positive testimony of many other witnesses, including a witness
who was not aware the accident was unfolding, and the objective findings on the train's
data event recorder. No genuine issue of material fact exists pertaining to the horn
being blown.
Finally, Plaintiffs contend that there is an issue of fact as to when the train crew
knew "Larrabee might cross in front of the train." (Id. at 16, jj 25.) There is no question
that the train crew was concerned about the vehicles they saw approaching the
crossing, as Plaintiffs contend. Likewise, it is obvious that all motorists "might" put
themselves in danger at a crossing. However, the possibility of what "might" or "might
not" happen is immaterial, and the crews' concern in fact caused them to vigilantly
observe the vehicles and when it became apparent to them that Larrabee "would" put
himself in danger by not remaining stopped, the train's brakes were applied.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
Defendants owed no legal duty to Plaintiffs' decedents to change the motor
vehicle traffic control devices then existing at the crossing, to operate the train at some
unspecified speed slower than the federal speed limit of 80 mph or its actual speed of
68 mph, to apply the train's emergency brakes to stop the train at some unspecified
point in time before they in fact were applied when it was apparent the Tempo was not
going to remain stopped at the stop sign or to sound the train's horn in a pattern
differently than it was blown. Affidavits submitted by Plaintiffs, although immaterial to
the trial court's granting of summary judgment on these claims, were properly stricken
as containing conclusory statements not based on personal knowledge and irrelevant,
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improper and unsupportable opinions. Finally, in addition to the fact that the law does
not impose legal duties onto Defendants to do what plaintiffs' contend, the evidence
supports only the conclusion that Larrabee solely caused the collision through his own
violation of the law and negligence in not seeing that which was capable of being seen,
and remaining stopped at the stop sign.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANTS OWED NO LEGAL DUTY TO DO WHAT PLAINTIFFS CLAIM THEY
SHOULD HAVE DONE TO PROTECT THE DECEDENTS FROM THE NEGLIGENCE
OF THE AUTOMOBILE DRIVER.
A.

DEFENDANTS HAD NO LEGAL DUTY TO PROVIDE DIFFERENT TRAFFIC
CONTROL DEVICES AT THE SUBJECT CROSSING.
The law recognizes that trains have the "unquestioned right of way" over public

crossings due to the train's momentum and inability to stop quickly, the confinement of
movements to the track, and the necessity and public nature of railway traffic. Pippy v.
Oregon Shortline R.R., 79 Utah 439, 11 P.2d 305, 310 (1932). Likewise, the mere
presence of a railroad track across a public road is generally sufficient warning of these
inherent dangers, and a motorist approaching a railroad crossing has a duty to yield the
right of way to any approaching train and must look, listen and, if necessary, stop in
order to avoid a collision. Id. at 309-10. See also Lundquist v. Kennecott Copper Co.,
30 Utah 2d 262, 516 P.2d 1182, 1184 (1973)("Since a railroad track is itself a warning
of danger, a traveler is duty bound to exercise proper precaution to inform himself as to
the proximity of trains before attempting to enter and to go over a crossing.").
Historically, when only horse-drawn vehicles and a few automobiles crossed
over public railroad crossings, the railroads themselves installed whatever warnings
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they chose to install at crossings with no input or support from state or federal
governmental agencies, and with no national uniformity. Those warnings typically were
signs that merely warned the traveler of the existence of the tracks which generally are
considered to be sufficient to allow motorists to exercise reasonable care to determine
whether it is safe to cross the track. However, as transportation and related safety
issues became more complicated and devices came into existence that actually could
warn not only of the track but of an approaching train (flashing lights) and also could
restrict vehicular movement (automatic gates), government agencies became
increasingly involved in crossing protection/traffic control issues to promote efficiency
and uniformity. Accompanying this increasing involvement by governmental entities is
the assumption by the government of corresponding responsibility for the adequacy of
crossing protection. Nevertheless, although motorists now have a better chance than
ever before of knowing of the existence of a crossing and in some cases of an
approaching train, for the same obvious reasons that existed in simpler times, motorists
have not been relieved of their responsibility at crossings to assess whether a train or
some other condition makes it unsafe to proceed over any particular railroad track.
Thus, when it comes to traffic control devices, the issue simply is whether the
motorist is alerted of the existence of the track so he or she can assess whether it is
safe to cross over the track. Advanced devices that warn of approaching trains and
prohibit vehicular movement merely aid the motorist in this assessment; they do not
replace the motorist's duty to exercise reasonable care for his or her own safety.
In this regard, it is significant that any of the various types of warning devices
available exist solely to regulate vehicular traffic at crossings, not train traffic. UDOT,
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not railroads, is equipped with the expertise in how to regulate highway traffic and give
notice to drivers of what they need to know to operate their vehicles safely. It makes no
sense to require railroads, who do not operate over roads, to duplicate what UDOT
does. Even those who do operate over public roads, such as long-haul trucking
companies, are not required to determine what types of traffic control devices are
appropriate for them and other motorists. It makes no sense for railroads or any other
entity to be required to act like a governmental entity and conduct traffic counts and
obtain information to enable them to do what state government does.
Therefore, it is not surprising that under Utah's current statutory scheme
regarding installation of warning devices at railroad crossings, and cases thereunder, it
is clear that UDOT, not the railroads, now has and at the time of the subject accident
had the duty to determine and provide for the installation of appropriate warnings at the
subject crossing for motor vehicle traffic. UTAH CODE ANN. § 54-4-15.1 specifically
provides:
The Department of Transportation so as to promote the
public safety shall as prescribed in the act provide for the
installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and improving of
automatic and other safety appliances, signals or devices at
grade crossings on public highways or roads over the tracks
of any railroad or street railroad corporation in the state.
See also UTAH C O D E A N N . § 54-4-15(2)(UDOT has the power to determine and
prescribe the manner of protection of railroad crossings). UDOT determines whether
existing conditions and signs are sufficient to warn motorists of the existence of the
track (so motorists can determine whether it is safe to cross) and which crossings would
benefit most from installation of more advanced devices that also warn of approaching
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trains and that physically restrain motorists from crossing a track when a train is
approaching.
The Utah Supreme Court held in Duncan v. Union Pacific Railroad Co., 842 P.2d
834 (Utah 1992), that under Section 54-4-15.1 UDOT has the exclusive responsibility
and power to determine which signs and warning devices will be placed at railroad
crossings and that railroads cannot be held liable in tort for the alleged inadequacy of
such devices. In fact, the Utah Supreme Court expressly rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that a railroad should do something where UDOT has not acted, and stated:
Plaintiffs' contention that Union Pacific should have a duty to
petition, urge, and even bring suit against UDOT to compel it
to improve the adequacy of the warning devices is
unavailing.
* **
UDOT's team, with the railroad and local government
representatives, makes on-site inspections of crossings
throughout the state, using the hazard index. Priorities are
then established, based on the degree of hazard found at
the crossings surveyed. In view of this careful and orderly
approach to the safety problem at crossings, we decline to
impose a duty on railroads to circumvent that process by
petitioning, urging, or bringing suit against UDOT to change
the order of its prioritizations.
Id. at 834. The court of appeals also rejected the argument that a railroad should take
affirmative action to protect a crossing when UDOT has not yet acted. Duncan v. Union
Pac. R.R, 790 P.2d 595, 599-600 (Utah App. 1990). Doing so would be in violation of
the law. UTAH C O D E A N N . §§ 41-6-27 and 28. Thus, contrary to Plaintiffs' argument, the
law does not require railroads to upgrade traffic control devices at crossings where
UDOT, who is actively assessing and upgrading such devices, has not yet done so.
Plaintiffs erroneously try to distinguish Duncan by discussing the legal concept of
"more than ordinarily hazardous" or ultra-hazardous crossings. In Duncan, the plaintiffs
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

sought damages for negligence against the railroad by asserting that the warning
devices employed at a particular crossing were inadequate. (According to Plaintiffs in
the case at bar, lack of adequate traffic control devices is at least a factor in rendering a
crossing ultra-hazardous.) Summary judgment for the railroad was granted by the trial
court and was affirmed by the court of appeals. 790 P.2d 595 (Utah App. 1990). The
Utah Supreme Court also affirmed. 842 P.2d at 832. Neither court's holdings note any
exception for crossings that were ultra-hazardous. To the contrary, the supreme court
explained that the crossing could not be found "more than ordinarily hazardous" as to
the railroad because the plaintiffs could not suggest what the railroad could have done
that it had a duty to do to make the crossing safer. Id. at 833-34. The court of
appeals, cited approvingly by the supreme court, stated that the significant liability
creating factors are those that apply to the railroad's "right of way." Id. at 833. Thus,
the court created concept of ultra-hazardous is dependent for its significance on the
railroad's legal duties, it does not create legal duties that subsequently have been
abolished by legislative action. Consequently, other courts in Utah have held that
UDOT is vested with exclusive authority to provide appropriate traffic control devices at
public railroad crossing and, accordingly, the railroads operating in this state cannot be
held liable for the perceived inadequacy of such devices as a matter of law, and in
doing so they also assumed the crossings at issue where ultra-hazardous. (See R.
1866-1907.)
In addition, nowhere will this Court find the holding that there exists two
disjunctive grounds for liability, one for more than ordinarily hazardous crossings for any
reason, including the inadequacy of warning devices, and the other for more than
ordinarily hazardous
crossings
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correct. Moreover, this contention strains logic. Why would there be two separate
grounds for liability when the first ground is so broad it encompasses the second
ground? Plaintiffs simply do not understand or they ignore the historical significance of
the "more than ordinarily hazardous" concept created by pre-Duncan case law.
Historically, Utah adhered to the rule of law that a plaintiffs contributory
negligence was a complete defense and would bar recovery even if the defendant also
had been negligent. This rule applied in negligence actions brought against railroads
for grade crossing accidents. Because so many victims of grade crossing accidents
were negligent to some degree because of their failure to yield the right of way, courts
constructed the doctrine that actions would not be totally barred if the particular
crossing, which railroads at the time had the duty to protect with warnings to motorists,
somehow was found to be more than ordinarily hazardous thereby affecting the
motorist's ability to yield to an approaching train.
Thus, in Utah, although the legislature now has abolished the contributory
negligence defense in lieu of the modified 50% comparative negligence doctrine, it still
is generally considered to be necessary to prove the grade crossing somehow is more
than ordinarily hazardous before a railroad can be held liable for its condition.
However, for purposes of determining a railroad's liability today in light of current
statutory law pertaining to traffic control warnings, the analysis is limited to factors
pertaining to the "railroad's right of way that creates a hazard to motorists greater than
the hazard presented by the simple fact that the railroad and the street intersect."
Duncan, 790 P.2d at 599 (emphasis added). Thus, there is only one basis for liability
predicated on the nature of the crossing and it pertains to the railroad's right of way,
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and expressly does not pertain to the adequacy of traffic control devices employed at
the crossing. In other words, it must be something over which the railroad has control,
such as its tracks or trees that are on its property. Since railroads no longer have
control over the type of warning devices employed at grade crossings, they cannot be
held liable for any insufficiency of those devices regardless of the comparative dangers
of the crossings. Therefore, Plaintiffs cannot get around Duncan and create a duty
based on the pre-Duncan and pre-Section 54-4-15.1 court created doctrine of "more
than ordinarily hazardous" that expressly has been limited. See also Walker v. Union
Pac. R.R., 844 P.2d 335, 341 n.6 (Utah App. 1992)("we note that, since the enactment
of Utah Code Ann. § 54-4-15.1 . . . railroads have been released from any duty to erect
gates or warning devices at a crossing.").
To further confuse this issue, Plaintiffs cite to old cases, applying the historical
common law duty, that predate the current statutory scheme and the Duncan Court's
unambiguous interpretation of that scheme to mean that UDOT has exclusive
responsibility for providing appropriate traffic control devices at all crossings in Utah. In
Duncan, the court of appeals recognized that "[a]t common law, this responsibility [to
control traffic] at railroad crossings was shared with the railroads." 790 P.2d at 599.
Thus, for example, railroads historically could be liable for failing to flag motorists. Id.
However, now that UDOT has the responsibility to control traffic and provide protection
at grade crossings, it is expressly recognized in Utah that railroads have "no duty to
place signs or road blocking devices, including flagmen," and they are "not liable in tort
for failure to do so." Id. at 599-600. The Utah Supreme Court affirmed stating, "we
decline to impose a duty on railroads to circumvent that process [UDOT's prioritization
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process] by petitioning, urging, or bringing suit against UDOT to change the order of its
prioritizations." 842 P. 2d at 834. Pre-Duncan common law cases, and the numerous
other cases Plaintiffs cite from other states, have no precedential value in this Court
which is required to follow the Utah legislature's and supreme court's current mandate.
Plaintiffs also are wrong in relying on the unpublished federal court opinion in
Wilde v. Denver & Rio Grande Western R.R., No. C-83-1495, 1985 WL 17370 (D. Utah,
Apr. 3, 1985), cited in Walker, for the proposition that railroads have the specific duty
alleged here because of that court's broad statement that the common law "reasonable
care standard requires the railroad to take other measures to reduce the risks of a
crossing commensurate with the risk it imposes upon the public." 844 P.2d at 341. The
risk of a collision exists at every single crossing. Those "other measures," whatever
they may be, certainly cannot be a duty to change the existing traffic control devices
which is prohibited by legislative law as confirmed by Duncan after Wilde. In fact,
although Plaintiffs raise the Wilde case as support for each of their alleged duties,
Wilde simply is not authoritative. Even if it were, it does not expressly hold that the
specific duties Plaintiffs claim continue to exist in light of current authoritative law that
does define the scope of railroads' specific duties. Plaintiffs' reliance on very general
statements in Wilde, that predates more specific current authority, is telling as to the
weakness of their claims regarding what legal duties exist with respect to the operation
of trains through grade crossings.
In a footnote, Plaintiffs also resort to reliance upon a statute that pertains to
"making and maintaining" "good and sufficient crossings at points where any line of
travel crosses its road." UTAH CODE A N N . § 56-1-11. There is no authority to support
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the position that this statute conflicts with, and somehow supersedes, the later enacted
and more specific statute interpreted by the Duncan Court, UTAH C O D E A N N . § 54-415.1, so as to require or allow railroads to assess on their own the need for warning
devices and to install whatever traffic control devices they may deem to be appropriate.
The statute cited by Plaintiffs does not address warning devices. Thus, it cannot be
interpreted to require such devices. See Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 732, 742 (Utah
1996)(courts "must presume that the legislature used each word advisedly" and they
"must give effect to each word according to its commonly accepted meaning"). This
maintenance statute addresses the points of the crossing where the road and track
intersect which Plaintiffs have not alleged to have been defective in causing their
decedents to drive in front of the approaching train. Moreover, Utah law requires
statutes to be read in a way that they do not conflict. See Ellis v. Utah State Retirement
Board, 757 P.2d 882, 884 (Utah App. 1988), affd, 783 P.2d 540 (Utah 1989). Whereas
Section 56-1-11 does not even address warning devices, Section 54-4-15.1 specifically
addresses "the installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and improving of automatic and
other safety appliances, signals or devices at grade crossings on public highways or
roads over the tracks of any railroad." Thus, reliance on Section 56-1-11 does not give
Defendants legal license, under the guise of track maintenance, to interfere with
UDOT's systematic approach to evaluating all crossings in Utah and to providing for
advanced traffic control devices on a prioritized basis as needed.
Finally, Plaintiffs argue that the United States Supreme Court, in CSX Transp.
Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1983), somehow overturns Utah legislative law and
imposes on railroads
in Utah the duty to provide at crossings sufficient traffic control
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devices for motor vehicle traffic. Plaintiffs do not understand the Easterwood case.
That case expressly holds that railroads' responsibility, if any, to provide warning
devices at crossings is preempted where federal funds are used for the devices. In
deciding whether federal preemption occurred in that case, the Court noted that the
case came out of Georgia and neither party advised the Court of Georgia law with
respect to the duties of railroads at grade crossings. Id. at 665 n.5. It was "not
assert[ed] that the complaint fails to state a claim under Georgia law. The sole issue
[t]here is preemption . . . ."3 The Court never decided what Georgia law was with
respect to railroads' duty in that state to provide traffic control devices at crossings, nor
whether, if no such duty existed, that law would for some reason be void as Plaintiffs
imply.4 The Court only held, on the assumption that such a duty did exist in Georgia,
that it was not preempted by federal law under the facts before it pertaining to the
funding of the devices then in place. Defendants are not claiming federal preemption
here because they do not need to in light of Duncan, and Easterwood does nothing to

3

Georgia's statutory scheme is not similar to Utah's statutory scheme set forth in UTAH C O D E ANN. §§
54-4-15 etseq. The statute cited by Plaintiffs was only stated by the Easterwood Court to provide that
the government only has the final authority for traffic control devices not that there is no allocation of
duties regarding such devices, such as in Utah.
4

Nowhere in federal law or regulations will the Court find any requirement that railroads' historical duty
to provide warning devices must be maintained in each and every state. Plaintiffs only have pointed for
this position to general statements of what regulators have not done, including a "proposed" Federal
Railroad Administration ("FRA") rule to "prohibit railroads from unilaterally selecting and installing highway
rail grade crossing warning systems at public highway-rail crossings." The FRA only regulates the
activities of railroads, not state legislatures or departments of transportation. Its proposal would have
further protected railroads from liability. It also would have been a step toward assuring uniformity of
warning devices nationwide regardless of the use of federal monies since railroads no longer would have
been allowed to install whatever devices they unilaterally determined to be necessary in those states
where they still could do so. However, the proposed rulemaking was terminated. Thus, states, unlike
Utah, who adhere to common law by allowing the imposition of liability on railroads who failed to select
and install necessary devices at a particular crossing could continue to do so. The FRA did not enter a
rule and its inaction cannot be considered to have imposed a rule that any state, such as Utah, cannot
enact its own statutory scheme abolishing railroad's common law liabilities.
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affect the validity of Duncan. If anything, Easterwood supports Duncan by
acknowledging that a state may choose not to impose specific legal duties on railroads
as has been done in Utah. Easterwood only provides another reason, federal
preemption, for holding as a matter of law that railroads have no specific legal duty to
do as Plaintiffs claim.
Defendants are not contending they have no duties whatsoever with respect to
the operation of trains through grade crossings, as Plaintiffs suggest. However, the law
of Utah unequivocally divests railroads of any duty or responsibility to install, upgrade,
maintain or replace any railroad crossing traffic control devices. Consequently, the law
necessarily recognizes that lack of adequate warnings will not render a railroad
negligent. Defendants had no duty to provide or even promote the installation of the
active warning devices Plaintiffs now claim should have been installed. This Court
should uphold the law on this issue as expressly declared by the Utah Supreme Court
in Duncan.

B.

DEFENDANTS HAD NO LEGAL DUTY TO OPERATE, OR REQUIRE AMTRAK
TO OPERATE, AMTRAK'S TRAIN SLOWER THAN THE FEDERAL SPEED
LIMIT.
In 1970, the United States Congress enacted the Federal Railroad Safety Act, 45

U.S.C. §§ 421-447, expressly preempting state law on railroad safety matters. See 49
U.S.C. § 20106 (formerly 45 U.S.C. § 434)("Laws, regulations and orders related to
railroad safety shall be nationally uniform to the extent practicable.") Under this
scheme, the Secretary of Transportation is required to address safety issues
associated with railroad operations, including accidents at railroad crossings.
Therefore, the Secretary has enacted a comprehensive regulatory scheme which
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train speeds, thereby preempting state common or statutory law. See 49 C.F.R. §
213.9 (1993). In addition, Congress has expressly forbidden states from unilaterally
interfering with train speeds without the input of federal regulators. 49 U.S.C. § 24702.
The United States Supreme Court has held that the maximum allowable train
speed established under 49 C.F.R. § 213.9 preempts all claims of excessive train
speed under state common law negligence theories as these federal limits are intended
to occupy the field to the exclusion of varying state standards. See CSX Transp., Inc.
vs. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658, 661-65, 673-76 (1993). In Easterwood, the Supreme
Court expressly held that if a train is not exceeding the maximum speed allowed by
federal law under Section 213.9, a party involved in a collision with the train cannot
claim the train speed was excessive under state common law negligence theories. Id.
See also St. Louis Southwestern Ry. v. Pierce, 68 F.3d 276, 278 (8th Cir. 1995)(truck
driver's claim that train speed of 49-50 miles per hour was excessive where federal
speed limit was 60 miles per hour was preempted); Gibson v. Norfolk S. Corp., 878 F.
Supp. 1455, 1463 (N.D. Ala. 1994), affd, 48 F.3d 536 (11th Cir. 1995)(excessive speed
claim preempted where train was traveling within range set by federal regulations).
Moreover, the federally established speed limits have been recognized to
expressly take into consideration conditions at crossings that render them "ultrahazardous." See, e.g., Juarez v. Union Pac. R.R., Civ. No. H-98-2593 (S.D. Tex. Dec.
3, 1999)(preemption despite history of accidents, foliage, trees, and inadequate audible
and visual warning devices at crossing); Thompson v. CSX Transp., Inc., No.
1:97CV528GR (S.D. Miss. Sep. 14, 1999)(preemption despite bent and nonreflectorized crossbucks); O'Bannon v. Union Pac. R.R., 960 F. Supp. 1411, 1419-21
(W.D. Mo. 1997)(preemption in spite of lack of active warning devices, steep grade,
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sharp angle of crossing, and proximity of crossing to highway); Herriman v. Conrail,
Inc., 883 F. Supp. 303 (N.D. Ind. 1995)(preemption despite nearby artificial lighting
obstructing train headlights to motorists); Armstrong v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe
Ry., 844 F. Supp. 1152 (W.D. Tex.1994)(preemption in spite of a high vehicular traffic
count and lack of automatic gate with flashing lights). These cases reflect the fact that
when the federal government preempted the field of train speed, it expressly —
considered the dangers associated with crossings, including the problems associated
with warning motorists and conditions that render crossings "ultra-hazardous."
The Federal Railroad Administration, who regulates train speed, recently
explained its train speed regulations as follows:
FRA's current regulations governing train speed do not
afford any adjustment of train speeds in urban settings or at
grade crossings. This omission is intentional. FRA believes
that locally established speed limits may result in hundreds
of individual speed restrictions along a train's route,
increasing safety hazards and causing train delays. The
safest train maintains a steady speed. Every time a train
must slow down and then speed up, safety hazards, such as
buff and draft forces, are introduced. These kind offerees
can enhance the chance of derailment with its attendant risk
of injury to employees, the traveling public, and surrounding
communities.
* **
In recent years, FRA has encountered increasing pressure
from communities along railroad rights-of-way to set slower
train speed on main tracks located in urban areas. They
typically cite the inherent dangers of grade crossing,
pedestrian safety, as well as the risk of derailments of rail
cars carrying hazardous materials.
As to grade crossings, FRA has consistently maintained that
their danger is a separate issue from train speed. The
physical properties of a moving train virtually always
prevents it from stopping in time to avoid hitting an object on
the tracks regardless of the speed at which the train is
traveling. Prevention of grade crossing accidents is more
effectively
achieved
through
use
of adequate
crossing
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warning systems and through observance by the traveling
public of crossing restrictions and precautions.
i

63 Fed. Reg. at 33999 (emphasis added).
The two cases cited by Plaintiffs are not helpful to Plaintiff. In Stone v. CSX
Transportation, Inc., 37 F. Supp.2d 789 (S.D. W.V. 1999), the motorist drove around

(

automatic gate arms and into the path of the train. The gate had malfunctioned and the
arms had been down since the prior day, and the railroad knew it. In fact, there was
evidence the railroad knew the gates regularly malfunctioned. Federal law required that
when gates malfunctioned the railroad was to take precautions, including slowing trains
to 15 mph. 49 C.F.R. § 234.107(c). The railroad conceded that it did not follow those
precautions. Id. at 795. Upon these unique facts, the plaintiff argued that the train
should have been required to go slower through that particular crossing and the court
obviously agreed as it was required to do because of the federal law that was violated.

*

Id. In Missouri Pacific Railroad Co. v. Lewan, 861 S.W.2d 501 (Tex. App. 1993), the
court upheld the "local safety hazard" exception to preemption because there was
i
evidence the train engineer knew that railroad tank cars, illegally parked near the
crossing, blocked motorists'view of his train. ]d. 510. There are no similar or
analogous facts in the case at bar that present such a discrete hazard.
Even Wilde is of no help to Plaintiffs inasmuch as the issue of federal
preemption as to train speed was never briefed, argued nor ruled upon to support that
court's general suggestion that it may be appropriate to reduce a train's speed at "ultrahazardous" crossings. Moreover, if mere "ultra-hazardous" crossings did present local
safety hazards, that exception would apply to numerous crossings throughout the state.
There are hundreds of crossings that do not have automatic gates, where the angle of
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approach is not perpendicular and where experts employable by plaintiffs can find a
host of other factors to opine the crossing is "ultra-hazardous." Plaintiffs' approach
ignores the fact that federal regulators, when setting speed limits, knew that crossings
had numerous varying configurations and types of warning devices, that trains cannot
stop quickly even at low speeds and that motorists are in the best position to stop and
avoid collisions, and it ignores the obvious conclusion that it guts the concept of federal
preemption and Congress' intent to achieve national uniformity to promote safety
among train crews, passengers and the public at large in lieu of just the rare motorist
who fails to yield the right of way. All such ultra-hazardous crossings are capable of
being adequately encompassed within uniform, national standards. A local safety
hazard "must be a discrete and truly local hazard, such as a child standing on the
railway. They must be aberrations which the Secretary could not have practically
considered when determining train speed limits

" O'Bannon, 960 F. Supp. at 1411

(cited as supporting authority by Plaintiffs in the instant action).
It is admitted that the maximum allowable speed under Section 213.9,
promulgated under 45 U.S.C. § 434, for passenger trains on the subject track was 80
mph and the subject train was traveling 68 mph, which is well below this maximum limit,
before the train's emergency brakes were applied. According to federal law, the
existence, or non-existence, of any particular type of traffic control device for motorists
or unique configuration of the crossing cannot negate the preemptive effect of the
federal speed limit. Federal regulators were aware of the differing configurations of
crossings and the varying types of traffic control devices employed at crossings, yet to
obtain maximum safety for all, they elected not to require trains to slow down for
specific types of crossings,
recognizing that as far as highway safety is concerned trains
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are not like automobiles and cannot be readily slowed or stopped even at very low
speeds. Plaintiffs' attempt to have this Court treat trains the same as automobiles has
long ago been rejected by the courts of this state. Pippy v. Oregon Shortline R.R., 11
P.2d at 310. It is significant that Plaintiffs have not even attempted to articulate, and
support with evidence, at what speed the train could have stopped so as to have
avoided the collision when Larrabee drove onto the track just as the train was entering
the crossing. There simply was no legal duty to have operated the train at some
unspecified slower speed as Plaintiffs claim.
C.

AMTRAK HAD NO LEGAL DUTY TO APPLY THE TRAIN'S BRAKES, IN
ORDER TO SLOW OR STOP THE TRAIN, SOONER THAN THEY WERE
APPLIED.
Utah law unequivocally provides that:
[an] engineer operating a train may assume, and act in
reliance on the assumption, that a person on or approaching
a crossing is in possession of his natural faculties and aware
of the situation, including the fact that a train is a large and
cumbersome instrumentality which is difficult to stop, and
that the person will exercise ordinary care and take
reasonable precautions for his own safety.

Lawrence v. Bamberger R R , 3 Utah 2d 247, 282 P.2d 335, 338 (1955). A duty to take
reasonable efforts to stop a train arises only where the engineer, based on the
exigencies of the occasion, knows or should know that a person's life or property is in
danger and that such person does not intend or is unable to meet his or her duty to
avoid the train. Id. In Lawrence, the supreme court affirmed the trial court's dismissal
of an action brought by the guardian of a 16 year-old boy after the boy was struck by a
train. The supreme court held that as a matter of law the train crew was not negligent
even though it did not stop or slow the train after seeing the boy on the track because at
the time there was nothing to indicate the boy would remain on the track. Id
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This legal standard expressed by the Utah Supreme Court also has been applied
by other courts. For example, in Bryan v. Norfolk & Western Railway Co., 154 F.3d 899
(8th Cir. 1998), cert, dismissed, 525 U.S. 1119 (1999), the Eighth Circuit held that
braking, according to Missouri law, is required "only when [the motorist] entered the
'zone of danger,' that point where an accident would certainly occur." Id. at 902. In that
case, the motorist entered the "zone of danger" at 10 mph and roughly two seconds
before the train arrived at the crossing. The court acknowledged that "[a]t 50 miles per
hour, the 47-car train could not possibly have stopped in so short a time." Id. Thus, no
question of fact existed, and summary judgment was affirmed. In addition, in Power v.
Union Pacific Railroad Co., 655 F.2d 1380, 1384 (9th Cir. 1981), the Ninth Circuit
recognized that as a matter of law an engineer owes no duty to slow or brake the train
simply because a person is observed on or near the track. Citing the Washington
Supreme Court, the court stated:
[0]ne operating a locomotive and train has a right to
assume, until the contrary becomes evident, that one
approaching the track in an automobile will give the train the
right of way, and is not required to attempt to bring his train
to a standstill because the automobile may be seen to be
approaching the track, but has a right to assume, until the
contrary appears, that the occupants of such automobile will
use reasonable care for their protection, and will give the
train the right of way to which it is entitled under the law.
Id. See also Andrews v. Metro N. Commuter R.R., 882 F.2d 705, 709-10 (2nd Cir.
1989)(same; stating that it is a "widely accepted doctrine of railroad law"); Deere v.
Southern Pac. Co., 123 F.2d 438, 443 (9th Cir. 1941), cert, denied, 315 U.S. 819
(1942)(same, applying Oregon law); Gibson v. Norfolk S. Corp., 878 F. Supp. 1455,
1464 (N.D. Ala. 1995), affd, 48 F.3d 536 (11th Cir. 1995) (same; applying Alabama
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(1973)(where a motorist proceeds slowly into the path of an approaching train,
Arkansas recognizes that train crew's failure to keep a proper lookout is not a triable
issue).
The rationale behind such a rule of law is obvious. Trains are large, fast moving
instrumentalities with which collisions should be avoided. A train cannot be easily
stopped or steered to avoid objects in its path, but its movements are predictable and
confined to the track. The behavior of drivers, on the other hand, is neither confined
nor predictable. It is much easier for a car to avoid a train by staying off of the track or
giving the train ample room to safely pass than it is for a train to stop once a dangerous
situation is presented to the train crew. If trains were required by law to stop or even
slow each time a vehicle was seen approaching the track, moving goods by rail would
be essentially impractical.
In addition, slowing trains every time an engineer has a concern and foresees
the mere possibility of a motorist driving in front of the train would create additional
dangers that more often than not would be unnecessary. It is a matter of common
knowledge that at virtually every crossing there is a motorist approaching the crossing
or already stopped who may not stop or who may suddenly drive in front of the
approaching train. Obviously, and fortunately, most motorists stop or remain stopped
and do not drive in front of an approaching train. Nevertheless, because of the
possibility some motorist may put him or herself at jeopardy, Plaintiffs contend the train
would have to be slowed or stopped just because there is a motorist in the area.
According to the FRA, who has studied the dangers of slowing trains, derailments could
occur from the buff and draft forces that exist when a train slows and speeds up.
Derailments obviously endanger railroad employees and passengers as well as
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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motorists and the surrounding community. 63 Fed. Reg. at 33999. Wisely, the law
does not require railroads to endanger its employees, its passengers, the public at large
and all motorists simply because it is possible a motorist will put him or herself at
danger.
Thus, it is the law of Utah, and virtually every other jurisdiction, that because of
the physics of a moving train on a confined track as compared to that of an automobile
on the road, trains have the right of way at grade crossings. UTAH C O D E A N N . § 41-695. For the same reasons, railroads have no legal duty to apply a train's brakes to try
to slow or stop unless and until it appears to the train crew that a motorist is in actual
danger of being hit if the train is not slowed or stopped. For safety reasons, trains are
to assume motorists will not put themselves in a position of being hit by a train.
Plaintiffs have not cited any case law contrary to the case law cited by defendants on
this point.5
There is no exception to this rule of law for more than ordinarily hazardous
crossings. Defendants do not have a legal duty to brake at crossings just because
there is a risk of a collision. That risk exists at every grade crossing. Plaintiffs' raising
this contention exemplifies their confusion between their claim that the train was

5

Plaintiffs did cite to MUJI 8.4 which actually supports Defendants' statement of law. It reads, in pertinent
part:
In determining whether the train crew should have determined or understood, in the
exercise of reasonable care, that the driver of an approaching vehicle was not going to
yield the right of way, you are to keep in mind that while extraordinary skill, caution and
foresight are to be admired, the law does not require such standard of conduct on the part
of train crews. The test of reasonableness is to be determined on the basis of foresight
and not hindsight. That is the picture, as it appeared to the crew before the accident. The
train operator is not required to anticipate negligent conduct on the part of an automobile
driver.
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traveling too fast (discussed above) with their claim that the train should have braked to
avoid the specific collision, after they realized there would be a collision if the brakes
were not applied.
In support of this legally untenable position, Plaintiffs cite only to MUJI 8.5
which reads:
TRAIN CREW MAY ASSUME MOTORIST
WILL USE DUE CARE
Unless the crossing is more than ordinarily hazardous, a
train crew approaching a crossing has the right to act upon
the assumption that the motorist was able to see and hear
the approaching train, and would stop before reaching the
track upon which the train was traveling. The crew has no
duty to slow down or attempt to stop the train, unless and
until they conclude, or in the exercise of reasonable care
should conclude, that the motorist is not aware of the
approaching train or is not going to stop or yield the right-ofway.
Apparently, Plaintiffs rely on the opening phrase to suggest that if a crossing is more
than ordinarily dangerous train crews must assume motorists will not see and hear the
approaching train and must stop the train when there are motorists near the crossing.
The cited references to this jury instruction do not support this broad conclusion of law.
No case is known to so hold. If this were the law, just because the crossing is deemed
to be ultra-hazardous and there exists a risk of a collision all trains would be forced to
stop whenever there was a motorist in the area even though, as in the instant case,
there is no reason to conclude the motorist would in fact drive in front of the train. The
train could not proceed again until all motorists had left the area. It is especially
nonsensical where, again as in the instant case, there is a clear path of visibility
between the train and motorist at a safe place, like at the stop sign before the crossing,
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where the motorist could see the train by simply looking for it. There is no reason to so
drastically alter the state of the law, as Plaintiffs suggest, in order to abolish federal
preemption as to train speed and give motorists the unfettered right of way rather than
trains. Lawrence v. Bamberger R.R., 3 Utah 2d 247, 282 P.2d 335 (1955), on which
MUJI 8.5 is based, not a confusing phrase in MUJI 8.5, is the law of this state on when
a train must apply its brakes in order to avoid a collision. To the extent Plaintiffs'
argument is nothing more than the prior argument that trains should go slower in the
area because the crossing is ultra-hazardous, although no motorist is yet in the zone of
danger, that claim is preempted by federal law as discussed above.
Plaintiffs argue that the Amtrak crew was concerned about whether the motorists
in the three vehicles were aware of the approaching train as the vehicles crossed 106th
South and were being driven toward the crossing. Plaintiffs must admit there is no
evidence the crew knew the motorists were unaware of the train. Neither is there any
evidence the crew knew the motorists would not later see the stop sign and track and
stop, look and listen for the approaching train, as they legally were required to do,
before attempting to drive across the track. As it turned out, the motorists obviously
were aware of the stop sign and track because they did stop. Unbeknownst to the
crew, however, Plaintiffs' decedents either did not adequately look or acted with
knowledge of the train, and Plaintiffs' decedents put themselves in the zone of danger
when it was too late for Amtrak to do anything to avoid the collision. Plaintiffs do not
refute that at that time, and for a significant period of time before then, there was
nothing Defendants could do to sufficiently slow or stop the train before hitting the
decedents' vehicle.
Thus,
the
crew
couldJ.have
known
the motorists
were not
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aware of the train as they crossed 106th South and were driving toward the crossing,
the law allows the crew to assume the motorists would become aware of its existence
and not intentionally drive in front of the train when the motorists stopped at the stop
sign before the crossing.
Not until Larrabee started to break the law by driving onto the track in front of the
train, could the Amtrak crew possibly have discovered that he may not obey the law and
risk his and his passengers' lives. At that point, when the train was just entering the
crossing, it was too late for Amtrak to avoid the collision. Amtrak had no legal duty to
brake any sooner to avoid hitting the decedents, as Plaintiffs contend, just because it
was possible the decedents ultimately would put themselves in danger.
D.

PLAINTIFFS' DECEDENTS WERE ABLE TO DISCOVER THE EXISTENCE OF
THE TRAIN AND AMTRAK HAD NO LEGAL DUTY TO SOUND THE TRAIN
HORN DIFFERENTLY THAN IT DID.
There is no dispute the Amtrak train was large and was in plain sight on the track

that was elevated above the road. In addition, it is admitted that the train had its
headlight illuminated, and that its light was much brighter than an automobile headlight.
Many of the decedents' friends, who looked, saw the train before the collision. Despite
this obvious warning of the train's existence, Plaintiffs contend Amtrak failed to warn the
decedents of the train's approach by failing to sound the train's horn in a different
pattern. This factual contention is irrelevant, since the train was discoverable, and it is
not supportable by the evidence of record.
There is ample positive evidence that the train's horn was sounded, in a pattern
of blasts, for a long period of time before the collision. Many of the decedents' friends
heard the horn. They did not hear it blow one single, long blast because it was blown in
the typical pattern of blasts which meant that there were moments during which it was
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not blown. An independent, uninterested witness heard the horn. Almost everyone
heard the horn at least once, and that fact is significant because there is no evidence to
dispute that the horn was in automatic mode wherein it blew the same pattern over and
over until it was turned off after the collision. Thus, the subjective recollections of those
who recall hearing the horn at various times supports the fact that it was being blown in
automatic mode as substantiated by objective, documented evidence from the event
recorder.6 As for those who do not recall hearing the horn, it is important to keep in
mind that a motorist stopped at a stop sign at a crossing has a duty in performing a
reasonable inspection to not only look but specifically listen for an approaching train.
The only two witnesses who do not remember hearing a horn, did not say there were
specifically listening for a horn. They were inside vehicles with windows rolled up and
radios playing while engaging in conversations with their friends. Consequently their
testimony is not competent to create an issue of fact.7
Plaintiffs raise the alternate contention that the horn should have been blown in a
different pattern. Plaintiffs believe the pattern should have been short staccato blasts,
relying on Amtrak's operating rules which they claim requires such a pattern "when an
emergency exists, or persons or livestock are on the track."

6

Data from the event recorder is not capable of being forgotten, or of being missed because of
inability to hear from car windows rolled up and the radio playing, or because of lack of adequate
attention while engaged in conversation. Nor does an event recorder become upset or emotional at
witnessing a horrific event or feel bias or prejudice. It is objective and does not lie. There is no basis to
find the event recorder on the subject locomotive malfunctioned or erred.
7

Such negative recollections is insufficient evidence, as a matter of law, to disprove the abundant
subjective and objective evidence that the horn was blown. Generally, negative evidence is insufficient
to support a jury verdict. E.g., Jensen v. Oregon Short Line R.R., 59 Utah 367, 204 P. 101, 104-05
(1922)(person who was in position to hear horn but was watching another passing train could not give
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The pattern of the horn is not a viable issue. Yet even if it were it also is
preempted since federal regulations occupy the field of sounding locomotive horns. 49
U.S.C. §20153; 49 C.F.R. §229.129(1995).

Plaintiffs disagree that this issue is

preempted but do not cite any supporting authority. Contrary to Plaintiffs' position, in
addition to federal statutes and regulations, at least one court to date has considered
the issue of horn pattern and found it to be preempted by Congress' occupying the field
of train horns. United Transp. Union v. Foster, No. 98-2443 § E/5, 1998 U.S. Dist.
Lexis 14576 (E.D. La. Sept. 9, 1998)(horn pattern and other state regulations affecting
audible signaling by locomotives held to be preempted by federal law).
Moreover, Plaintiffs' repetitive argument that an exception to preemption arises
because of a local safety hazard is misplaced for the same reasons discussed above.
Congress and federal regulators could have required any specific horn pattern under
varying circumstances but they did not, and especially because of automatic sounding
devices used on locomotives it would be a burden to interstate commerce to require
railroads to provide different patterns in each state.
In addition, it is significant that in arguing for an exception to preemption in the
context of horn patterns, Plaintiff acknowledges that the law only requires a response
from train engineers (to brake and as Plaintiffs now argue to sound a different horn
pattern) when "there is a likelihood of danger," citing Lawrence, 282 P.2d at 338, not
when there is just a possibility of danger. Also, the rule Plaintiffs rely upon does not
apply, by its own terms, until it is observed that the track is fouled or a collision is
imminent. Contrary to Plaintiffs' innuendos, there is no evidence the train crew knew or
should have known Larrabee would not remain stopped at the stop sign. Thus, even
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according to Plaintiffs own reasoning, if there were no federal preemption, there still
could be no legal duty under the undisputed evidence of record.
Thus, as a matter of law, Plaintiffs cannot argue to a jury and recover from
Defendants on the basis that Defendants tried to warned Plaintiffs' decedents of the
approaching train with one pattern of horn blasts rather than another pattern. There is
no evidence that any specific pattern of horn is better than another or would have made
any difference. This issue is not legally supportable and only invites speculation.
There is no competent, admissible evidence of record that supports Plaintiffs'
theory that Amtrak failed to give adequate warning of the train's presence. Competent,
positive evidence is uncontroverted that a horn was sounded prior to the collision and
that it in fact did not make a difference. Moreover, this factual issue, if it were at issue,
is a red herring in that the visible train itself was sufficient warning of the train's
existence, particularly from a stopped position at the stop sign before the crossing.
Amtrak had no legal duty to do anything differently in audibly warning the decedents to
stay put and not drive in front of the discoverable Amtrak train.
POINT II
GOOD GROUNDS EXISTED FOR THE TRIAL COURT TO STRIKE THE AFFIDAVITS
SUBMITTED BY PLAINTIFFS.
Rule 56(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, provides that affidavits submitted in
opposition to a motion for summary judgment "shall be made on personal knowledge,
shall set forth such facts as would be admissible in evidence, and shall show
affirmatively that the affiant is competent to testify to the matters stated therein." Once
these foundational issues are resolved, the affidavits of the party opposing summary
judgment also "must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
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trial." In other words, the statements made by the affiants must be relevant. Affidavits
that do not meet the requirements of Rule 56(e) are subject to being stricken. Howick
v. Bank of Salt Lake, 28 Utah 2d 64, 498 P.2d 352 (1972).
The Utah Rules of Evidence also require that statements of fact, to be
admissible, must be relevant. Utah R.Evid. 402. Statements of fact also must be
based on personal knowledge. Utah R.Evid. 602. Statements made on information
and belief cannot create an issue of fact. Discussing the competency of an affiant to
render the statements made in an affidavit, the Utah Supreme Court has explained:
Under Utah R.Civ.P. 56(e), an affidavit on information and
belief is insufficient to provoke a genuine issue of fact. In
Walker v. Rocky Mountain Recreation Corp., 29 Utah 2d
274, 508 P.2d 538 (1973), we held that an opposing affidavit
under Rule 56(e):
[Mjust be made on personal knowledge of the
affiant, and set forth facts that would be
admissible in evidence and show that the
affiant is competent to testify to the matters
stated therein. Statements made merely on
information and belief will be disregarded.
In Jones v. Hinkle, Utah, 611 P.2d 733 (1980), we cited
l/Va//cerwith approval and stated that when a motion for
summary judgment is made under the Rule, "the affidavit of
an adverse party must contain specific evidentiary facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial."
Treloggan v. Treloggan, 699 P.2d 747, 748 (Utah 1985). In Treloggan, affidavits of the
party opposing summary judgment were held to be deficient because they contained no
evidentiary facts, "but merely reflected the affiant's unsubstantiated opinions and
conclusions." Id. See also GNS Partnership v. Fullmer, 873 P.2d 1157, 1164-65 (Utah
App. 1994)(Rule 56(e) affidavit held to have been properly stricken where affiant lacked
personal knowledge).
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The admissibility of opinion testimony is expressly limited. If an opinion is
offered by a lay witness, the opinion must be "rationally based on the perception of the
witness." Utah R.Evid. 701. If an opinion is offered by an expert witness, that witness
must be qualified to render the opinion "by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or
education." Utah R.Evid. 702. In addition to being "qualified," the opinions of an
"expert" must be shown to be based on inherently reliable principles and techniques
that also have been shown to be properly applied to the facts of the particular case.
State v. Crosby, 927 P.2d 638, 640-41 (Utah 1996). For either type of opinion
testimony, it also must be found to be helpful to the trier of fact to understand the
evidence or to determine a fact in issue. Utah R.Evid. at 701 and 702.
Affidavits containing opinions also must set forth foundational facts required by
the rules of evidence, in other words specific facts that logically support the opinion.
Butterfield v. Okubo, 831 P.2d 97, 104 (Utah 1992). Indeed the Utah Supreme Court
has emphasized the need to set forth in affidavits specific foundational facts.
[W]e stress the requirement that rule 56(e) requires specific
facts. . . . [A] bare assertion that the expert has reviewed
the facts and based his or her opinion on them will not
suffice.
Id. (emphasis in original). See also King v. Searle Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 832 P.2d 858,
864 n.2 (Utah 1992)(lack of experience with CU-7, no statistical data regarding device
and no literature or research conducted with respect to device rendered purported
expert's opinion of what CU-7 would do to a human insufficient for lack of necessary
foundational facts).
Furthermore, with respect to opinion testimony, opinions that require a legal
conclusion may not be considered. Davidson v. Prince, 813 P.2d 1225, 1230-31 (Utah
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App. 1991), cert, denied, 826 P.2d 651 (Utah 1991). In Davidson, the court cited as
support cases that held that: an opinion on whether an individual was "negligent" is
inadmissible (Shahid v. City of Detroit, 889 F.2d 1543 (6th Cir. 1989)); an opinion on
whether there had been a "search" in plaintiffs residence is inadmissible (Specht v.
Jensen, 853 F.2d 805, 808-09 (10th Cir. 1988), cert, denied, 488 U.S. 1008 (1989));
and an opinion on whether a party's actions were "prudent mine practices" is
inadmissible (Smith v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 814 F.2d 1481, 1485 (10th Cir. 1987)).
The Davidson Court expressly held that an expert could not render the conclusory
opinion that a party's conduct was negligent. 813 P.2d at 1230-32. Thus, opinions
based upon the witnesses' legal conclusions are inadmissible.
Obviously, for the reasons discussed above with respect to Rule 702, opinions of
unqualified persons as to controlling law are improper. But in addition to that reason, it
is clear that only the court, not witnesses, are to decide issues of law applicable to the
case at bar. Thus, even a person qualified to render legal opinions cannot testify as to
the law applicable to the case. The Utah Supreme Court explained:
[l]t is a basic maxim of law that testimonial opinion on the
state of the law is to be excluded. The function of an
expert is to relate an opinion of fact to the jury. The opinion
is either material in terms of the applicable law or it is not.
The jurors must apply the opinion (if they give it credit) in
terms of the court's instructions concerning applicable law.
An . . . opinion on the applicable law does not aid the jury,
which is duty-bound to apply the law as stated by the court.
Ashton v. Ashton, 733 P.2d 147, 153 (Utah 1987). See also First Sec. Bank v.
Banberry Crossing, 780 P.2d 1253, 1258 (Utah 1989)(legal duty owed by trust deed
trustee to trustor is question of law to be determined by the court, and not question of
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fact suitable for testimony by expert in real estate law). Therefore, witnesses may not
render opinions on the law applicable to the case.
The affidavits of Archie Burnham, Randy S. Hunter, Orlando Jerez, J. Clark
Clendenen and Paul F. Byrnes all fail for these reasons. Most significantly, these
witnesses try to tell the trial court what the law should be and their opinions simply are
irrelevant in light of what the law actually is. The deficiencies in these affidavits speak
for themselves despite Plaintiffs' contentions to the contrary. As did the trial court, this
Court too should analyze the actual language of the affidavits in the light of the law
discussed above including the law pertaining to railroads' legal duties at crossings.
Pursuant to such law, the affidavits were properly stricken and the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in so ruling.
POINT ill
BRENT LARRABEE'S NEGLIGENCE IS THE SOLE PROXIMATE CAUSE OF THE
COLLISION AND BARS PLAINTIFFS' RIGHT TO RECOVER.
Larrabee failed to remain at a stop, as he was required to do by law when a train
was approaching, but instead drove in front of an oncoming train. UTAH C O D E A N N . §
41-6-95. As discussed above, at least while stopped perpendicular to the track, he had
the legal duty to look for an approaching train. In order for the collision to occur, the
train necessarily was very close to the intersection. There were no obstructions to
Larrabee's view for over one-half mile down the track. Larrabee either failed to
adequately look or he recklessly tried to beat the train across the crossing. In either
case, the collision would not have occurred, which resulted in his and the other
decedents' deaths, had Larrabee simply stayed put at the stop sign as he legally was
required to do in light of the approaching train.
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Based upon these facts, this Court can and should impute contributory
negligence to Larrabee as a matter of law. See Lundquist v. Kennecott Copper Co., 30
Utah 2d 262, 516 P.2d 1182, 1184-85 (1973); Abdulkadirv. Western Pac. R.R, 7 Utah
2d 53, 318 P.2d 339, 341-42 (1957); Butler v. Payne, 59 Utah 383, 203 P. 869, 870-71
(1921). In each of these cases, the driver's negligence was found as a matter of law.
There is no reason that Larrabee could not have seen the train from a zone of
safety at the stop sign had he exercised reasonable care to look. His friends saw the
train! These undisputed facts warrant this Court finding that reasonable minds could
not conclude that anyone other than Larrabee was solely at fault for the collision and
resulting deaths. Plaintiffs' claims should be barred as a matter of law because of the
undisputed conduct of Larrabee which is the sole proximate cause of their damages.
CONCLUSION
As a matter of law, Defendants cannot be found to be liable to Plaintiffs on the
theories Plaintiffs' allege. Defendants do not contend they have no duties. However,
they do not have the legal duties claimed by Plaintiffs in this case. Therefore,
Defendants request that this Court affirm the trial court's entry of judgment in their favor
and against Plaintiffs and award Defendants their costs on appeal.
Dated this

day of March, 2000.
BERMAN, GAUFIN, TOMSIC, SAVAGE & CAMPBELL

By
ev K. McGarvey
McGarve1
Casey

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy of the within and foregoing
BRIEF OF APPELLEES NATIONAL RAILROAD PASSENGER CORPORATION AND
SOUTHERN PACIFIC TRANSPORTATION COMPANY to be mailed, postage prepaid,
thisp7rA day of March, 2000 to the following:
David J. Jordan
Mark E. Hindley
Stoel Rives L.L.P.
One Utah Center, Suite 1100
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-4904
Robert A. Schuetze
Richard P. R. Cohn
Cortez Macaulay Bernhardt & Schuetze LLC
1600 Broadway Suite 1600
Denver, Colorado 80202
Allan L. Larson
Snow, Christensen & Martineau
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor
P. O. Box 45000
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000

(l^fW^M^

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

ADDENDUM
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49 §20101

201 GENERAL
SUBCHAPTER I—GENERAL

§ 2 0 1 0 1 . Purpose
The purpose of this chapter is to promote safety in every area of
railroad operations and reduce railroad-related accidents and incidents.
(Added Pub.L. 103-272, § 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat 863.)
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports
1994 Acts.

Revised Section
20101

Source (U.S. Code)
Source (Statutes at Larse)
45:421.
Oct 16, 1970, Pub.L. 91-458, § 101, |
84 Stat. 971.

The words "The Congress declares
that" are omitted as surplus. The words
"accidents and incidents" are substituted
for "accidents" for consistency with the
source provisions restated in section
20105(b)(1)(B) of the revised tide. The
words "and to reduce deaths and injuries
to persons and to reduce damage to property caused by accidents involving any
carrier of hazardous materials" are omitted as obsolete because they applied to 49
App-1761 and 1762, that were repealed
by section 113(g) of the Hazardous Materials Transportation Act (Public Law
93-633, 88 Stat 2163). House Report
No. 103-180.
Short Title
1994 Amendments. Pub.L. 103-440,
Tide I, § 101, Nov. 2, 1994, 108 Stat
4615, provided that "This tide [enacting

sections 26101 to 26105 of this tide, redesignating former sections 26101 and
26102 as 28101 and 28102 of this title,
respectively, and enacting provisions set
out as notes under section 26101 of this
tide and section 838 of Tide 45, Railroads] may be cited as the 'Swift Rail
Development Act of 1994'."
Pub.L. 103-440, Tide II, § 201, Nov. 2,
1994, 108 Stat 4619, provided that:
'This tide [enacting sections 20145 to
20151 and 21108 of this tide, amending
sections 103, 20103, 20111, former section 20116, and sections 20117, 20133,
20142, and 21303 of this tide, and enacting provisions set out as a note under
former section 11504 of this tide] may be
cited as the 'Federal Railroad Safety Authorization Act of 1994'."

LIBRARY REFERENCES
American Digest System
Regulation and control of railroads generally: regulation of railroad operations;
° injuries arising from operation of railroad, see Railroads <§>3 et seq., 222(1)
et seq., 223 et seq., 273 k et seq.
Encyclopedias
R e l a t i o n and control of railroads generally, regulation of railroad operations;
fajSies arising from operation of railroad, see C J.S. Railroads §§ 27 et
seq., 393 et seq., 477 et seq.
WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH
Railroads cases: 320k[add key number].
See, also, WESTLAW guide following the Explanation pages of this volume.
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49 § 20106

In subsection (b)(3), the text of
45:435(b)(2d sentence) and the words "as
he deems", "reasonable", and "with respect to such safety rules, regulations,
orders, and standards are omitted as
^^
\
.
, N/ix ,
1 «

A'uSSM,^0"Lg.

chapter or otherwise made available",
"reasonably", and "satisfactory" are
omitted as surplus. The words "will be
at least M m u c h ^ the a
e amount
^ ^ d
expended-. m
for -wilI b e
maintained at a level which does not fall
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ance with" for clarity and consistency in t u r e s f o r ^ ^ m d t 0 eliminate unnecthis section.
essaiy words.
House Report No.
In subsection (e), the words "out of 1 0 3 ~ 1 8 0 funds appropriated pursuant to this subCROSS REFERENCES
Regulations, standards, or requirements in force prescribed by State agency
participating in investigative and surveillance activities under this section
deemed statutes under provisions relating to liability for injuries to railroad
employees, see 45 USCA § 54a.
LIBRARY REFERENCES
Administrative Law
Qualification and certification of locomotive engineers, see 49 CFR § 240.1 et seq.
Railroad locomotive safety standards, see 49 CFR § 229.1 et seq.
Railroad operating practices, see 49 CFR § 218.1 et seq.
Railroad safety enforcement procedures, see 49 CFR § 209.1 et seq.
State safety participation regulations, see 49 CFR § 212.1 et seq.
American Digest System
Regulation and control of railroads; state regulation, see Railroads ^>5 et seq.,
223 et seq.
Encyclopedias
Regulation and control of railroads; state regulation, see C J.S. Railroads §§ 27 et
seq., 393 et seq., 395.

WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH
Railroad cases: 320k[add key number].
See, also, WESTLAW guide following the Explanation pages of this volume.

§ 2 0 1 0 6 . National uniformity of regulation
~~ Laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad safety shall be
nationally uniform to the extent practicable. A State may adopt or
continue in force a law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety
until the Secretary of Transportation prescribes a regulation or issues
an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement A
State may adopt or continue in force an additional or more stringent
law, regulation, or order related to railroad safety when the law,
regulation, or order—
(1) is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local
safety hazard;
j
(2) is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or order of the
United States Government; and
.-•/•.
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(3) does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce.
(Added Pub.L. 103-272, § 1(e), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 866.)
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports
1994 Acts.
Revised Section
20106

Source (U.S. Code)
45:434.

In this section, before clause (1), the
words "The Congress declares that" are
omitted as unnecessary. In clause (3),
the word "unreasonably" is substituted

Source (Statutes at Large)
Oct 16, 1970, Pub.L. 91-458, § 205,
84 Stat 972.
|

for "undue" for consistency in the revised
tide and with other tides of the United
States Code. House Report No. 103-180.

CROSS REFERENCES
Audible warnings at highway-rail grade crossings regulations as including impact
statement with respect to operation of this section, see 49 USCA § 20153.
Visible markers for rear cars regulations as not prohibiting certain State laws
continuing in force notwithstanding this section, see 49 USCA § 20132.

LIBRARY REFERENCES
American Digest System
Regulation and control of railroads generally; statutory and official regulation, see
Railroads G=>5 et seq., 223 et seq.
Encyclopedias
Regulation and control of railroads generally; statutory and official regulation, see
C J.S. Railroads §§ 27 et seq., 393 et seq.
WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH
Railroads cases: 320k[add key number].
See, also, WESTLAW guide following the Explanation pages of this volume.
NOTES OF DECISIONS
Generally 1
Conductor qualifications 4
Effect of state provisions 2
Engineer or conductor qualifications *
Essentially local safety hazards 3
Force and effect of state provisions 2
Speed limits 5
Train operator qualifications 4
Warning devices at grade crossings 6
1. Generally
For purposes of this section, state regulation covers the same subject matter as
Federal Railroad Safety Act (FRSA) regulation, for preemption purposes, if it addresses the same safety concerns as the
federal regulation. State v. Wisconsin

Cent Transp. Corp., WisApp. 1996, 546
N.W.2d 206.
2. Force and effect of state provisions
Federal Railway Safety Act (FRSA),
which is comprehensive system of railway safety regulations, expKcidy provides
that it and connected regulations preempt
state law, but allows state law to continue
in effect until Secretary of Transportation
prescribes regulation or issues order covering subject matter of state requirement.
Thiele v. Norfolk & Western Ry. Co.,
C A 7 and.) 1995, 68 F J d 179.
Code section providing for exemplary
damages for wanton and reckless disregard for public safety in storage, handling
or transportation of hazardous or toxic
substances was not preempted by Federal

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. 16
Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Ch- 201

GENERAL

49 § 2 0 1 5 3

§ 2 0 1 5 3 • Audible warnings at highway-rail grade crossings
(a) Definitions-—As used in this section—
(1) the term "highway-rail grade crossing'' includes any street
or highway crossing over a line of railroad at grade;
(2) the term ' locomotive horn" refers to a train-borne audible
warning device meeting standards specified by the Secretary of
Transportation; and
(3) the term ''supplementary safety measure" refers to a safety
system or procedure, provided by the appropriate traffic control
authority or law enforcement authority responsible for safety at
the highway-rail grade crossing, that is determined by the Secretary to be an effective substitute for the locomotive horn in the
prevention of highway-rail casualties. A traffic control arrangement that prevents careless movement over the crossing (e.g., as
where adequate median barriers prevent movement around
crossing gates extending over the full width of the lanes in the
particular direction of travel), and that conforms to standards
prescribed by the Secretary under this subsection, shall be
deemed to constitute a supplementary safety measure. The
following do not, individually or in combination, constitute supplementary safety measures within the meaning of this subsection: standard traffic control devices or arrangements such as
reflectorized crossbucks, stop signs, flashing lights, flashing
lights with gates that do not completely block travel over the fine
of railroad, or traffic signals.
(b) Requirement—The Secretary of Transportation shall prescribe
regulations requiring that a locomotive horn shall be sounded while
each train is approaching and entering upon each public highwayrail grade crossing.
(c) Exception-—(1) In issuing such regulations, the Secretary may
except from the requirement to sound the locomotive horn any
categories of rail operations or categories of highway-rail grade
crossings (by train speed or other factors specified by regulation)—
(A) that the Secretary determines not to present a significant
risk with respect to loss of life or serious personal injury;
(B) for which use of the locomotive horn as a warning measure is impractical; or
(C) for which, in the judgment of the Secretary, supplementary safety measures fully compensate for the absence of the
* warning provided by the locomotive horn.
i-'
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(2) In order to provide for safety and the quiet of communities
affected by train operations, the Secretary may specify in such
regulations that any supplementary safety measures must be applied
to all highway-rail grade crossings within a specified distance along
the railroad in order to be excepted from the requirement of this
section.
(d) Application for waiver or exemption,—Notwithstanding any
other provision of this subchapter, the Secretary may not entertain
an application for waiver or exemption of the regulations issued
under this section unless such application shall have been submitted
jointly by the railroad carrier owning, or controlling operations over,
the crossing and by the appropriate traffic control authority or law
enforcement authority. The Secretary shall not grant any such
application unless, in the judgment of the Secretary, the application
demonstrates that the safety of highway users will not be diminished.
(e) Development of supplementary safety measures.—(1) In order
to promote the quiet of communities affected by rail operations and
the development of innovative safety measures at highway-rail grade
crossings, the Secretary may, in connection with demonstration of
proposed new supplementary safety measures, order railroad carriers operating over one or more crossings to cease temporarily the
sounding of locomotive horns at such crossings. Any such measures
shall have been subject to testing and evaluation and deemed necessary by the Secretary prior to actual use in lieu of the locomotive
horn.
(2) The Secretary may include in regulations issued under this
subsection special procedures for approval of new supplementary
safety measures meeting the requirements of subsection (c)(1) of this
section following successful demonstration of those measures.
(f) Specific rules.—The Secretary may, by regulation, provide that
the following crossings over railroad lines shall be subject, in whole
or in part, to the regulations required under this section:
. (1) Private highway-rail grade crossings.
(2) Pedestrian crossings.
" (3) Crossings utilized primarily by nonmotorized vehicles and
other special vehicles.
Regulations issued under this subsection shall not apply to any
location where persons are not authorized to cross the railroad.
(g) Issuance.—The Secretary shall issue regulations required by
this section pertaining to categories of highway-rail grade crossings
that in the judgment of the Secretary pose the greatest safety hazard
to rail and highway users not later than 24 months following the date
of enactment of this section. The Secretary shall issue regulations
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pertaining to any other categories of crossings not later than 48
months following the date of enactment of this section.
(h) Impact of regulations.—The Secretary shall include in regulations prescribed under this section a concise statement of the impact
of such regulations with respect to the operation of section 20106 of
this tide (national uniformity of regulation).
(Added Pub.L. 103-440, Tide III, § 302(a), Nov. 2, 1994, 108 Stat 4626.)
HISTORICAL AND STATUTORY NOTES
Revision Notes and Legislative Reports
1994 Acts. House Report No. 103-692,
see 1994 U.S. Code Cong, and Adm.
News, p. 3670.
References in Text
The date of enactment of this section,
referred to in subsec. (g), is the date of

enactment of section 302(a) of Pub.L.
103-440, which enacted this section and
which was approved Nov. 2, 1994.

LIBRARY REFERENCES
Administrative Law
Railroad operating practices, see 49 CFR § 218.1 et seq.
American Digest System
Regulation of operation of railroad; signals and lookouts; signals and warnings at
crossings, see Railroads <&=243, 244, 306 et seq.
Encyclopedias
Regulation of operation of railroad; signals and lookouts; signals and warnings at
crossings, see C J.S. Railroads §§ 433, 725 et seq.
WESTLAW ELECTRONIC RESEARCH
Railroads cases: 320k[add key number].
See, also, WESTLAW guide following the Explanation pages of this volume.
NOTES OF DECISIONS
State regulation or control 1
1. State regulation or control
See, abo, Notes of Decisions under secdion 20/06 of this title.
Ordinances prohibiting audible train
warnings at specified railroad crossings

were not preempted by High-Speed Rail
Development Act, notwithstanding ordinances could be preempted by federal
regulations as authorized by Act if and
when
promulgated; Act authorized pre*mV*on through regulation but did not
itseir preempt Civil City of South Bend,
Indiana v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,
N.D.Ind. 1995, 880 RSupp. 595.
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§ 20153, Audible warnings at highway-rail grade crossings
[See main volume for text of (a) to (f)] ;

.

(g) Issuance,—The Secretary shall issue regulations required by this section pertaining to categories of highway-rail grade crossings that in the judgment of the Secretary
pose the greatest safety hazard to rail and highway users not later than 24 months
following November 2, 1994. The Secretary shall issue regulations pertaining to any
other categories of crossings not later than 48 months following November 2, 1994.
[See main volume for text of (h)]
/

(i) Regulations.—In issuing regulations under this section, the Secretary—
(1) shall take into account the interest of communities that—
(A) have in effect restrictions on the sounding of a locomotive horn at
highway-rail grade crossings; or
(B) have not been subject to the routine (as defined by the Secretary)
sounding of a locomotive horn at highway-rail grade crossings;
(2) shall work in partnership with affected communities to provide technical
assistance and shall provide a reasonable amount of time for local communities to
install supplementary safety measures, taking into account local safety initiatives
(such as public awareness initiatives and highway-rail grade crossing traffic law
enforcement programs) subject to such terms and conditions as the Secretary
deems necessary, to protect public safety; and
(3) may waive (in whole or in part) any requirement of this section (other than a
.- requirement of this subsection or subsection (j)) that the Secretary determines is
. not likely to contribute significantly to public safety.
(j) Effective date of regulations.—Any regulations under this section shall not take
effect before the 365th day following the date of publication of thefinalrule.
(As amended PubX. 104-264, Title XII, § 1218(a), Oct 9, 1996, 110 Stat 3285; PubJL 104-287,
§ 5(51), Oct 11,1996,110 Stat 3393.)
. . - . . . ,
.

0

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

§213*9 Classes of track: operating
speed limits.
(a) Except as provided in paragraphs
(b) and (c) of this section and
§§ 213.57(b), 213.59(a), 213.113(a), and
213.137 (b) and (c), the following maxi- *
mum allowable operating speeds apply:
Pn mites per hour]
; The maxi- j The maximum almum allowable
lowable
Over track that meets all of the reoperating
operating
quirements prescribed in this part
speed f a
speed for
farpassenger
freight
trains is—
trains ts—
Class 1 track
Class 2 track
C1*-«>S 3 taaok
Class 4 tnv*
Class 5 tn^ck
Class 6 track

10
25
40
60
80
110

15
30
60
80
90
110

Cb) If a segment of track does not
meet all of the requirements for its intended class, it is reclassified to the
next lowest class of track for which, it
does meet all of the requirements of
this part. However, if the segment of
track does not at least meet the requirements for Class 1 track, operations may continue at Class 1 speeds
for a period of not more than 30 days
without bringing the track into compliance, under the authority of a person designated under § 213.7(a), who has
a t least one year of supervisory experience in railroad track maintenance,
after that person determines that operations may safely continue and subject
to any limiting conditions specified by
such person.

(c) Maximum operating speed may
not exceed 110 m.p.h. without prior approval of the Federal Railroad Administrator. Petitions for approval must be
filed in the manner and contain the information required by §211.11 of this
chapter. Each petition must provide
sufficient information concerning the
performance characteristics of the
track, signaling, grade crossing protection, trespasser control where appropriate, and equipment involved and
also concerning maintenance and inspection practices and procedures to be
followed, to establish that the proposed
speed can be sustained in safety.
[36 FR 20338, Oct 20, 1971, as amended a t 38
FR 875, Jan. 5,1973; 38 FR 23405, Aug. 30,1973;
47 FR 39402, Sept. 7, 1982; 48 FR 35883, Aug. 8,
1983]
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41-6-27. Prohibition of unauthorized signs, signals,
lights or markings — Commercial advertising
— Public nuisance — Removal.
(1) A person may not place, maintain, or display upon or in
view of any highway any unauthorized sign, signal, light,
marking, or device which purports to be or is an imitation of or
resembles an official traffic-control device or railroad sign or
signal, or authorized emergency vehicle flashing light, or
which:
(a) attempts to direct the movement of traffic;
(b) hides from view or interferes with the effectiveness
of any official traffic-control device or any railroad sign or
signal; or
(c) which is of such brilliant illumination and so positioned as to blind or dazzle an operator on any adjacent
highway.
(2) A person may not place or maintain nor may any public
authority permit upon any highway any traffic sign or signal
bearing on it any commercial advertising except for business
signs included as part of official motorist service panels
approved by the Department of Transportation. This provision
does not prohibit the erection upon private property adjacent
to highways of signs giving useful directional information and
of a type that may not be mistaken for official signs.
(3) Every prohibited sign, signal, or light, or marking is
declared to be a public nuisance and the authority having
jurisdiction over the highways may remove it or cause it to be
removed without notice.
1987
41-6-28. Interference with signs and signals prohibited.
A person may not without lawful authority attempt to or in
fact alter, deface, injure, knock down, or remove any official
traffic-control device or any railroad sign or signal or any
inscription, shield, or insignia on it, or any other part of it.
1987
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41-6-93. Driving on tracks.
• (a) It is unlawful for the driver of any vehicle proceeding
upon any track in front of a railroad train upon a street to fail
to remove such vehicle from the track as soon as practicable
after signal from the operator of such train.
(b) When a railroad train has started to cross an intersection no driver of a vehicle shall drive upon or cross the tracks
or in the path of such train within the intersection in front of
such train.
1953
ARTICLE 13

SPECIAL STOPS REQUIRED
41-6-95. Railroad grade crossing — Duty to stop —.
Malfunctions and school buses — Driving
through, around, or under gate or barrier
prohibited.
k*
(1) Whenever any person driving a vehicle approaches a'
railroad grade crossing, the driver of the vehicle shall stop"
within 50 feet but not less than 15 feet from the nearest rail of
the railroad track and may not proceed if:
';«
(a) a clearly visible electric or mechanical signal device*
gives warning of the immediate approach of a train; ^ :
(b) a crossing gate is lowered, or when a human flagman gives or continues to give a signal of the approach or
passage of a train;
•* : t
(c) a railroad train approaching within approximately'
1,500 feet of the highway crossing emits a signal audible"
from such distance and the train by reason of its speed or
nearness to the crossing is an immediate hazard;
J:
(d) an approaching train is plainly visible and is in
hazardous proximity to the crossing; or
.*£
(e) there is any other condition that makes it unsafe to
proceed through the crossing.
.:.;
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54-4-15- Establishment and regulation of grade crossings,
(1) No track of any railroad shall be constructed across a
public road, highway or street at grade, nor shall the track of.
any railroad corporation be constructed across the track of any
other railroad or street railroad corporation at grade, nor shall
the track of a street railroad corporation be constructed across
the track of a railroad corporation a t grade,' without t h e
permission of the Department of Transportation having first
been secured; provided, that this subsection shall not apply to
" the replacement of lawfully existing tracks. The department
shall have the right to refuse its permission or to grant it upon
such terms and conditions as it may prescribe.
(2) The department shall have the power to determine and
prescribe the manner, including the particular point of crossing, and the terms of installation, operation, maintenance, use
and protection of each crossing of one railroad by another
railroad or street railroad, and of a street railroad by a
railroad and of each crossing of a public road or highway by a
railroad or street-railroad, and of a street by a railroad or vice
versa, and to alter or abolish any such crossing, to restrict the
use of such crossings to certain types of traffic in the interest
of public safety and is vested with power and it shall be its
duty to designate the railroad crossings to be traversed by
school buses and motor vehicles carrying passengers for hire,
and to require, where in its judgment it would be practicable,
a separation of grades at any such crossing heretofore or
hereafter established, and to prescribe the terms upon which
such separation shall be made and the proportions in which ;
the expense of the alteration or abolition of such crossings or '
the separation of such grades shall be divided between the |
railroad or street railroad corporations affected, or between ]
such corporations and the state, county, municipality or other ;
public authority in interest.
.(3) Whenever the department shall find that public convenience and necessity demand the establishment, creation or ~:.
construction of a crossing of a street or highway over, under or
upon the tracks or lines of any public utility, the department
may by order, decision, rule or decree require the establishment, construction or creation of such crossing, and such *
crossing shall thereupon become a public highway and cross- |k g .

- . - . - - .

;

.^•v;::^i^rr^;-f
> -> \
(4) (a) The commission retains exclusive jurisdiction for i:
4
'%r/.-^-^f^^ ;>?;.'
the resolution of any dispute upon petition by any person ;*•
"~-r-•~-*^t~:-l£"-#v-; V--.
aggrieved by any action of the department pursuant to ]/•*
:;'
.. " . ^ > ;,
• this section, except as provided under Subsection (4XbX
:
v
.: % v
.."}••; ; :\~~V* ' - J
- ft) If a petition is filed by a person or entity engaged in
a
;•:?-•:%•..>">/-X"-.Vs."V
. subject activity as defined in Section 19-3-318, t h e \
v :
O •': .;.:-'"- /-; '**... .;.u\.^'••; v
commission's decision under Subsection (4Xa) regarding •
r :
"£?":?^ ;.' ? /;-V_~'\*.A^--."'?".-:;;.."resolution of a dispute requires the concurrence of the ;
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54-4-15.1. Signals or devices at grade crossings — Duty
to provide.
The Department of Transportation so as to promote the
public safety shall as prescribed in this act provide for the
installing, maintaining, reconstructing, and improving of automatic and other safety appliances, signals or devices at
grade crossings on public highways or roads over the tracks of
any railroad or street railroad corporation in the state, 1975

Ci*1.

••»*•>

54-4-15.2* Signals or devices at grade crossings —
Funds for payment of costs.
The funds provided by the state for purposes of this act shall
be used in conjunction with other available moneys, including
those received from federal sources, to pay all or part of the
cost of the installation, maintenance, reconstruction or improvement of any signals or devices described in Section
54-4-15.1 at any grade crossing of a public highway or any
road over the tracks of any railroad or street railroad corporation in this state.
1973
54-4-15.3. Signals or devices at grade crossings — Apportionment of costs.
The Department of Transportation, in accordance with the
provisions of Section 54-4-15, shall apportion the cost of the
installation, maintenance, reconstruction or improvement of
any signals or devices described in Section 54-4-15.1 between
the railroad or street railroad and the public agency involved.
Unless otherwise ordered by the department, the hability of
cities, towns and counties to pay the share of maintenance cost .
assigned to the local agencies by the department shall be
limited to the funds provided under this act. Payment of any
moneysfromthe funds provided shall be made on the basis of.
verified claimsfiledwith the Department of Transportation by :
the railroad or street railroad corporation responsible for the
physical installation, maintenance, reconstruction or improvement of the signal or device,
1975

r*

54-4-15.4. Signals or devices at grade crossings — Provision of costs*
The Department of Transportation shall provide in its
annual budget for the costs to be incurred under this act.
/

1975
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R930-5-2. Authority.
Under the Authority of Chapter 204, Laws of
•Utah, certain functions formerly the responsibility
of the PSC have been transferred to UDOT, including those involving transportation planning, construction and safety generally. Also, prior to the
initiation of actual construction of a project, an
agreement between UDOT and the railroad com-,
pany involved shall be prepared in accordance withj.
the FHWA provisions of Volume 6, Chapter 4, Sec-j
tion 2 and Volume 1, Chapter 6, Section 3 of the '
FHPM. Railroad participation shall be in conform-|j
ance with the FHWA provisions of Volume 6, Chap-Ij
ter 6, Section 2, Paragraph 6 of the- FHPM.
i
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R930-5-4. Railway-Highway Projects.
A. Grade Crossing Protection: This group includes
all projects for protection of existing at-grade crossings of highways and railways by automatic warning
devices. Where it has been determined that active
warning devices are warranted, automatic flashing
light signals with gates at railroad crossings of
two-lane highways and a combination of flashing
light signals with gates and cantilever flashing light
signals at railroad crossings of multilane highways
will be placed. Exceptions may be allowed if recommended by the Railroad Crossing Surveillance
Team. The Railroad Crossing Surveillance Team
shall establish the priority in which existing cross-_
ing shall be upgraded to meet this standard insofar
as funding will allow.
B. Participation:
1. As specified in the FHWA provisions of the
FHPM, projects for grade crossing improvements,
including crossing rehabilitation and surfacing improvements, are deemed to be of no ascertainable
benefit to the railroads, and there shall be no required railroad share of the costs. However, nothing
shall preclude a railroad from participating in the
cost of a project if they so desire. Also, other parties
may voluntarily participate in the cost of crossing
improvement projects.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
HOUSTON DIVISION

FRANCISCO JUAREZ AND
§
GREGORIA JUAREZ, INDIVIDUALLY
AS SURVIVING PARENTS AND AS
NEXT FRIEND OF NATIVIDAD
JUAREZ, A MINOR CHILD AND AS
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ESTATE
OF ROSA JUAREZ, DECEASED
§
§
§

and

SOTERO VILLAMAR AND ANSELMA §
VILLAMAR INDIVIDUALLY AND AS §
THE SURVIVING PARENTS AND AS §
REPRESENTATIVES OF THE ESTATE
OF HILDA VILLAMAR, DECEASED,
Plaintiffs,

v.
UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD
COMPANY and NATIONAL
RAILROAD PASSENGER
CORPORATION (AMTRAK),
Defendants.

§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§
§

CIV. NO. H-98-2593

ORDER
Pending before the Court is the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Document
#24) filed by Defendants Union Pacific Railroad Company and National Railroad
Passenger Corporation (AMTRAK) and the Amended Motion for Summary Judgment
(Document #43) filed by Plaintiffs Francisco Juarez, Gregoria Juarez, Sotero Villamar,
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and Anselma Villamar. Having considered the motions, submissions, oral argument and
the applicable law, the Court determines that the Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment should be granted in part and denied in part and the Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgment should be denied.
On March 22, 1998, Rosa Juarez and Hilda Villamar were passengers in an
automobile driven by Waldo Ortiz Villalobos (collectively "Plaintiffs"). The automobile
was headed northbound on River Road in Rosenberg, Texas. During the trip, the
automobile came upon a series of railroad crossings. The automobile was struck by an
eastbound locomotive owned and operated by Defendant National Railroad Passenger
Corporation ("AMTRAK") as it crossed the last set of railroad tracks, which, are owned
and maintained by Defendant Union Pacific Railroad Company ("Union Pacific"). Rosa
Juarez and Hilda Villamar were killed in the accident. The parents of Rosa Juarez and
Hilda Villamar filed this cause of action against Union Pacific and AMTRAK.
In their complaint, the Plaintiffs allege that Union Pacific and AMTRAK were
negligent for failing to install adequate warning devices at the crossing, operating the train
at an excessive rate of speed, failing to control the vegetation near the roadbed, and failing
to equip the locomotive with certain safety devices, specifically, "ditch lights."l
Defendants Union Pacific and AMTRAK moved for partial summary judgment on each
1

Certain locomotives have a headlight configuration consisting of two sets of
headlights: a set close together and a wider-set pair. "Ditch lights" refers to the widerset pair.
2
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C-.
of these four theories of recovery. The Court will address each in turn.
Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there
is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.w Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c). Thus, summary judgment is
mandated "against a party who fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence
of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden
of proof at trial/ Celotex Corp. v. Catrett. 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986); see also State
Farm Life Ins. Co. v. Guttermann. 896 F.2d 116, 118 (5th Cir. 1990).
The Plaintiffs allege that Union Pacific's crossing at River Road ("the crossing")
is "extra-hazardous" because Union Pacific and AMTRAK used inadequate warning
devices to protect the crossing. At the time of the accident, the crossing was protected by
passive warning devices, specifically, reflectorized crossbucks and advance warning signs.
Plaintiffs argue that there should have been active warning devices installed at the crossing,
such as flashing lights and automatic gates. Union Pacific and AMTRAK argue that
Plaintiffs' claim is preempted by federal law.
The Secretary of Transportation has issued regulations that govern the protection
devices to be placed at railroad grade crossings, codified at 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3) &
/

(4). The Supreme Court has held that these federal regulations preempt state law tort
claims regarding the maintenance of the crossings. See CSX Transp.. Inc. v. Easterwood,
3
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507 U.S. 658, 670 (1993). Since Easterwood. the Fifth Circuit has been quite clear that
if federal funds "participated" in the installation of "warning devices," then "common law
claims based on inadequate signalization are preempted." Hester v. CSX Transp.. Inc.T
61 F.3d 382, 386 (5th Cir. 1995). However, "there must be an actual, authorized
expenditure of federal funds in the installation or placement of safety devices at the
particular crossing to trigger preemption." IdL, n.6.
In the instant case, there is no dispute that federal funds were used to install the
reflectorized crossbucks at the crossing. The uncontro verted evidence is that the State of
Texas used federal highway funding to install or upgrade reflectorized crossbucks at the
crossing between 1979 and 1981.

Moreover, federal funding was used to affix

retroreflective material to the back of the crossbucks and their support posts between 1989
and 1991. Each project was funded 90% with federal funds and 10% with state funds.
Accordingly, the Plaintiffs' inadequate warning claims should be preempted.
Notwithstanding these facts, the Plaintiffs argue that their claims are not preempted
because the crossbucks were inadequate pursuant to 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3). 23
C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3) requires that certain crossings must be protected by automatic
gates with flashing lights. See 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3)(i)(B) (indicating that adequate
warning devices are to include flashing lights and automatic gates when the crossing
involves multiple tracks and the movement of an approaching train might be obscured).
Moreover, the State of Texas identified this railroad crossing for an upgrade to automatic
4
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gates with flashing lights in 1993.2
Despite this argument, the Court notes that uonce federal funds have been expended
towards grade crossing safety devices, and those devices are installed and operating, state
law negligence claims are preempted by federal regulations." Bryan v. Norfolk and
Western Ry. Co.. 154 F.3d 899, 904 (8th Cir. 1998), cert, dismissed. 119 S.Ct. 921
(1999). "Preemption is not a water spigot that is turned on and off simply because a later
decision is made to upgrade a crossing." Bock v. St. Louis Southwestern Ry. Co.. 181
F.3d 920, 923 (8th Cir. 1999). Rather, "once a federally funded warning device is
installed and operational - the crossbucks in this case - preemption occurs." RL (citations
omitted). As noted by the Tenth Circuit, "[T]he issue is not what warning system the
federal government determines to be necessary, but whether the final authority to decide
what warning system is needed has been taken out of the railroad's and the state's hands
under 23 C.F.R. § 646.214(b)(3) & (4)." Armijo v. Atchison. Topeka and Santa Fe Rv.
Co.. 87 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 1996) quoted in Bock. 181 F.3d at 923. Because
federal funds were utilized in the installation and upgrade of the crossbucks during 1979
to 1981, and 1989 to 1991, federal law preempts the Plaintiffs' inadequate warning claims
in the instant case and they are therefore dismissed.
Plaintiffs further contend that AMTRAK was negligent for operating its train at an
2

Although federal funds had been earmarked for the upgrade, they had not
"participated" in the installation of the active warning devices at the time of the
accident in the instant case.
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excessive rate of speed at the crossing. AMTRAK argues that Plaintiffs' excessive speed
claim is also preempted by federal law.
The Secretary of Transportation has issued regulations that provide the maximum
speed limits for freight and passenger trains on particular classes of track, codified at 49
C.F.R. § 213.9(a). The Supreme Court has held that these federal regulations preempt
state common law claims based on excessive speed. Easterwood. 507 U.S. at 675-6. In
the instant case, the uncontradicted evidence demonstrates that the tracks in question
qualified as Class 3 tracks. Under the speed regulations of 49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a), the
maximum speed limit for a passenger train is 60 miles per hour. This speed limit was
further reduced to 50 miles per hour pursuant to the Southern Region Timetable No. 1,
effective April 14, 1996. The evidence presented to the Court indicates that the AMTRAK
train was traveling at 49 miles per hour immediately prior to the accident. The train's
speed was therefore well within the mandated speed limit. Plaintiffs offer no evidence to
the contrary.
Instead, Plaintiffs argue that their claim is not preempted because the crossing at
issue qualified as a "local hazard." The preemption clause of the Federal Railroad Safety
Act ("FRSA") contains a savings clause which allows states to "adopt or continue in force
... more stringent... rule[s] ... relating to railroad safety when necessary to eliminate or
reduce an essentially local safety hazard ...." 45 U.S.C. § 434. Plaintiffs seek to avoid
preemption in the instant case by arguing that this crossing is "extra-hazardous" because
6
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of u a prior history of similar wrecks, the foliage, trees, lack of sufficient audible devices
in use, and lack of flashing warning signals and gates while approaching the intersections
...." Plaintiffs' Original Complaint, at 4.
Congress created the "local hazard" exception to the FRSA so that states could
address unique local conditions that could not be adequately addressed by uniform national
standards and were not statewide in character. Easterwood v. CSX Transp., Inc.. 933
F.2d 1548, 1553 n.3 (11th Cir. 1991), affd, 507 U.S. 658 (1993). The aforementioned
circumstances that, according to Plaintiffs' claim create a "local hazard" in the instant
case, are not unique to the individual crossing in question. Rather, such characteristics are
found in numerous railroad crossings throughout the state.
"[T]he legislative history [of the FRSA] makes it abundantly clear that this savings
clause is to be narrowly construed." IdL "Plaintiffs' common-law theory of negligence
for failure to slow a train under certain circumstances where ('local hazards' exist), would
amount to a statewide rule." Wrieht v. Illinois Central R.R. Co.. 868 F.Supp. 183, 187
(S.D. Miss. 1994). If the Court were to adopt Plaintiffs' understanding of the "local
hazard" exception, the exception would swallow the general FRSA rule of preemption.
Because the crossing at question is not "an essentially local safety hazard," the savings
clause of the FRSA does not apply in the instant case. Plaintiffs' excessive speed claim
* is therefore preempted by federal law and is accordingly dismissed.
The Plaintiffs further contend that Union Pacific was negligent for failing to
7
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properly control the vegetation near the crossing to allow for adequate visual warning.
Union Pacific contends that this claim is preempted by federal law. Alternatively, Union
Pacific contends that it complied with all applicable state statutes concerning the control
of vegetation.
The Secretary of Transportation has issued regulations that provide that track
owners must keep "[vjegetation on railroad property which is on or immediately adjacent
to the roadbed ... controlled...." 49 C.F.R. § 213.37. The Fifth Circuit has held that
these federal regulations preempt all state regulation of vegetation immediately adjacent
to the roadbed. Missouri Pacific R.R. Co.. etal. v. Railroad Comm. of Texas. etaL. 833
F.2d 570, 577 (5th Cir. 1987). The Fifth Circuit defined the term "immediately adjacent
to the roadbed" as the area that "abuts the roadbed." Id Thus, to the extent that the
Plaintiffs are bringing claims for the vegetation abutting the foundation structure for the
tracks, the claims should be preempted.
Further, Plaintiffs' vegetation claims are subject to a second qualification: Texas
law. The applicable provision provides:

$

At unprotected public grade crossings, each railroad corporation shall control
vegetation on its right-of-way (except for the roadbed and areas immediately
adjacent, thereto) for a distance of 250 feet each way from the centerline of
said crossings so that vegetation does not block the vehicular highway
traffic's view of approaching trains. The 250 feet shall be measured from
the point where the centerline of the railroad crosses the centerline of the
public road.
16 Tex. Admin. Code § 5.809(c) (West 1998). The uncontroverted evidence presented
8
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to the Court shows that the vegetation within 250 feet of the centerline of the River Road
crossing was controlled on the date of the incident. Plaintiffs' only evidence in response
confirms the Defendants' position.

Accordingly, Plaintiffs' vegetation claims are

dismissed to the extent they concern vegetation on or immediately adjacent to the roadbed,
or within Defendants' right-of-way for a distance of 250 feet in either direction from the
centerline of the crossing.3
Finally, Plaintiffs claim that AMTRAK negligently failed to equip the locomotive
at issue with certain safety devices, specifically ditch lights.

However, AMTRAK

presented the Court with definitive evidence that the locomotive was equipped with ditch
lights on March 22, 1998. Plaintiffs fail to address this issue in their response to the
motion for partial summary judgment. Hence, there is no genuine issue of material fact
regarding the locomotive's equipment. Plaintiffs negligent failure to equip claim is
therefore dismissed.4 Accordingly, the Court hereby
ORDERS that the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment (Document #24) filed by
the Defendants is GRANTED IN PART and DENIED IN PART. Plaintiffs' inadequate

3

Plaintiffs' claims that address vegetation within Union Pacific's right-of-way,
but not on or immediately adjacent to the roadbed or within 250 feet of the centerline of
the crossing as discussed supra, are not dismissed.
4

Defendants further argue that Plaintiffs' negligent failure to equip claim is
preempted by federal law. Because the uncontroverted evidence shows that the
locomotive had ditch lights, there is no federal preemption, and summary judgment is
therefore denied as to this limited preemption issue.
9
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warning claims, excessive rate of speed claim, negligent failure to control vegetation
claims (to the extent they concern vegetation on or immediately adjacent to the roadbed or

i

within Defendants' right-of-way for a distance of 250 feet in either direction from the
centerline of the railroad crossing), and negligent failure to equip the locomotive claim are
i
DISMISSED. All relief not specifically granted herein is DENIED. The Amended
Motion for Summary Judgment (Document #43) filed by the Plaintiffs is DENIED.
SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on this the

*3

day of December, 1999.

DAVID HITTNER
United States District Judge
i

i
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF MISSIS&PP
SOUTHERN DIVISION
!fl'

ROSE THOMPSON, Individually and for the
Benefit of the Lawful Heirs of BRADLEY
JAMES THOMPSON, Deceased

PLAINTIFF

VS.

CIVIL ACTION NO. l:97cv528GR

CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.

DEFENDANT
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This cause comes before the Court on the motion of the defendant, CSX Transportation, Inc.
[CSX] for partial summary judgment [12-1] pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. Pursuant to
the Memorandum Opinion entered in this cause, this date, incorporated herein by reference, it is hereby,
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that defendant's motion for partial summary judgment [12-1] in
the above styled and numbered cause be, and is hereby, granted in part and denied in part as follows.
Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiffs negligence claims relating to the train's
speed in excess of track limits is granted as these claims are preempted under federal law. In addition,
defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiffs claims regarding any need for additional
or different grade crossing warning devices is granted as this is also preempted under federal law.
Defendant's motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiffs claims concerning the maintenance of the
grade crossing warning devices is denied. It is further,
ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that each party shall bear their respective costs in connection with
this motion.
SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED, this the 14th day of September, A.D., 1998.

UNITED STATE^DISTRICT JUDGEDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT C O W ? .
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF M I S S p R p f ™ ° f ^
SOUTHERN DIVISION

gF

MlSS,SSJPPI

SEP 1 4 B99
ROSE THOMPSON, Individually and for the
Benefit of the Lawful Heirs of BRADLEY
JAMES THOMPSON, Deceased

VS.

BY.

BUN, CLERK
.DEPUTY!

2m
7

PLAINTIFF

CIVIL ACTION NO. l:97cv528GR !

CSX TRANSPORTATION, INC.

DEFENDANT
MEMORANDUM OPINION

This cause comes before the Court on the motion of the defendant, CSX Transportation, Inc.
[CSX], for partial summary judgment [12-1] pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. After due consideration of the evidence of record, the briefs of counsel, the applicable law
and being otherwise fully advised in the premises, the Court finds as follows.
Standard of Review
A grant of summary judgment is appropriate when, viewed in the light most favorable to the
nonmoving party " . . . the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact
FED.R.Ov.P.

56(C).

The moving party initially carries the burden of demonstrating the absence of a

genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). Should this
burden-be met by the moving party, the nonmoving party then must establish sufficient facts beyond the
pleadings to show that summary judgment is inappropriate. Exxon Corp. v. Burglin, 4 F.3d 1294,
1297 (5th Cir. 1993). The facts and the inferences to be drawn from those facts are examined in the
light most favorable to the plaintiff. Coleman v. Houston Indep. Sch. Dist., 113 F.3d 528, 533 (5th
Cir. 1997). The Court examines applicable substantive law to determine which facts and issues are
material. King v. Chide, 974 F.2d 653, 655-56 (5th Cir. 1992). The nonmoving party must oppose
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the summary judgment motion either by referring to evidentiary material already in the record or by
submitting additional evidentiary documents which set out specific facts indicating the existence of a
genuine issue for trial. Morriss v. Covan World Wide Moving, Inc., 144 F.3d 377, 380 (5th Cir.
1998).
Statement of Facts
This suit was filed by Rose Thompson, individually and-on behalf of all the heirs of Bradley
James Thompson, after a train/automobile accident in which Bradley James Thompson sustained fatal
injuries, (CompL, p. 2.) The collision occurred on September 1, 1994, at approximately 12:40 P.M. at
the DeLauney Street crossing in Biloxi, Mississippi. (Id.) According to Ross E. Franklin, the train's
engineer at the time of the accident, the train was traveling at the rate of 42 miles per hour [M.P.H.]
(Def.'s Summ. J. Mot., Exh. A.) Franklin also avers that the train had its headlights on bright, was
ringing its bell, and continuously sounded warning blasts on its horn from a spot at least one-quarter
mile before the DeLauney Street crossing. (Id.)
The plaintiff contends that the accident was a result of alleged negligence of the defendants.
(Id., 1 o.) Plaintiff contends that defendant's negligence includes operating the train at an txctssive
speed, because the train was moving through the city of Biloxi and given the conditions at the crossing.
(Id., 1 a.) Plaintiff also asserts that the defendant failed to install and maintain reasonably adequate
crossing protective devices at its grade crossings. (Id., J1 c, e, L)
The track where the collision occurred is class four, for which the maximum speed is 60 M.P.H.
(Def/s Summ. J. Mot., Exh. A; see 49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a)). Defendant contends that the issue of train
speed is preempted by the regulations issued at 49 C.F.R. § 213.9, citing the United States Supreme
Court's decision in CSX Trans., Inc. v. Easterwood, 507 U.S. 658 (1993). The plaintiff argues that
the train's speed has not been verified by the speed tape, and that defendant's proffered affidavit should
not be considered as determinative on the speed issue. (PL's Resp. Br., pp. 1,4.) In addition, the
2
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(

plaintiff contends diat the issue of the operation of the train at an excessive speed in view of the local

I

hazard of bent, nonreflectorized crossbucks constitutes a local hazard which should survive preemption.
( « - . p . 1.)
The plaintiff also claims that because Newton McCormick, state rail engineer for the
Mississippi Department of Transportation [MDOT], adrnrred submitting a false affidavit concerning the
i

use of federal funds in installing the crossbucks at the crossing, there is no federal preemption on the

J

issue of the adequacy of grade crossing warning at the srs. (Id., pp. 1-2.) According to the plaintiff,

j

even if federal preemption applies in this case, the fact ±11 the crossbucks were bent and had lost

{

reflectorization rendered them nonoperational. (Id., p. 3.) The loss of reflectorization caused the

I

i

|

crossbucks to be out of federal compliance and not subjer to preemption. (Id.) Preemption also would :
i

not apply to a claim for negligent maintenance of the eroding or failure to warn the public of the

\

defective nature of the crossing, according to the plaintiff. (Id., p. 4.) Plaintiff argues that under

j

Mississippi law, the railroad is required to erect and m a ^ i n reflectorized crossings, thus supporting
plaintiffs contentions. (Id., pp. 4-5.)

I

Serving the crossing at the time of the collision ^>re several passive1 warning devices,
including a crossbuck sign on each side,2 an advance wanmg sign on each side and a white crossbuck

I

painted on the pavement on each side of the crossing. TD± crossing had no train-activated devices.

j

i

(Def.'s Summ. J. Mot., Exhs. F &. G.) CSX has provide evidence that during 1981 and 1982, federal j
funds were expended to repaint the pavement markings zsL to replace the advance warning signs and
crossbuck signs. (Id., Exhs. C-G.)

j

CSX asserts that McCormick's statement concenmg the adequacy of documentation

l

See 23 C.F.R. § 646.204(1).

Crossbuck signs are required by statute in Mississippi. Sez Miss. Code Ann. § 77-9-247.
3
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concerning the reflectorization of the crossbucks has nothing to do with the fact that ail the remaining
statements made in his affidavit concerning grade crossing warnings are correct. (Def.'s Reb., p. 2.)
CSX has established that federal funds were used to install pavement markings and advance warning
signs at the DeLauney Street crossing. (Def/s Summ. J. Mot., Exhs. C-G.) Accordingly, under
Easrerwood and its progeny, if federal funds have participated in the installation of warning devices,
the Secretary of Transportation is required to have determined the devices adequate for the safety of the
crossing. (Id., p. 3.) CSX further contends that this Coun has found the signals at the subject crossing
to be adequate, citing Williams v. CSX Trans., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 447 (S.D. Miss. 1996). CSX
contends that it is entitled to partial summary judgment on plaintiffs claims that different or additional
signal devices were needed at die DeLauney Street crossing. (Def/s Reb., p. 8.)
CSX also maintains diat the plaintiff has presented no evidence to contradict Franklin's
statement that the train was moving at 42 M.P.H. (Id., p. 4.) According to CSX, there is no local
safety hazard at the crossing, because the State of Mississippi has not passed legislation addressing the
issue of whether bent crossbuck arms constitute a local safety hazard. (Id., p. 5.)
Conclusions of Law
The defendants have moved for partial summary judgment on the plaintiffs claim of excessive
speed. CSX contends that the relevant state common law has been preempted by the Federal Rail
Safety Act [FRSA], 49 U.S.C. §§ 20101-213ll3; and specifically, 49 U.S.C. § 20106. The Court's
inquiry regarding each claim is controlled by the Supreme Court's decision in Easrerwood.
In Easrerwood, the Court held that under the FRSA, federal regulations adopted by the
Secretary of Transportation preempted the plaintiffs common law claim of negligence as it related to
Easterwood's claims of excessive train speed. Although Easterwood conceded that the train was

*The FRSA was previously codified at 45 U.S.C. § 421, et seq. On July 5, 1994, the former version of the
FRSA was repealed, amended and moved to 49 U.S.C. §§ 20101 to 21311.
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traveling under the maximum speed allowed by the federal regulations at the subject crossing, she
maintained that the defendant "breached its common-law duty to operate its train at a moderate and safe
rate of speed." Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 675. The Court was not persuaded and held that "under the
[FRSA], federal regulations adopted by the Secretary of Transportation preempt" common-law speed
restrictions. Id. Accordingly, the Court concluded that Easterwood's "excessive speed claim [could]
not stand in light of the Secretary's adoption o f . . . § 213.9." Id. at 676.
I.

Preemption of Speed Claims
In this case, Thompson claims that because die speed tape is the best evidence of the train's

actual speed, Franklin's affidavit concerning the speed of the train cannot establish the speed. (Pl/s
Resp., p. 4.) In addition, the plaintiff maintains that die bent and nonreflectorized crossbucks at die
crossing constitute a local hazard of such a nature as to require the train to reduce its speed. (Id.)
Plaintiff has submitted no evidence to contradict the affidavit in which Franklin avers that the
train was traveling at 42 M.P.H. Plaintiff contends that the signals at the crossing were in a state of
disrepair, which, combined with the allegation that the train did not downwardly adjust its speed to
accommodate diese conditions, created a situation wherein preemption is not mandated. (PL's Resp.,
p. 4.)
CSX maintains that state law claims relating to the train's speed are preempted by the FRSA.
The FRSA does not exclusively occupy the field, because Section 20106 preemption also has a savings
clause, which preserves state law claims related to railroad safety "until the Secretary of Transportation
prescribes a regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement." 49
C.F.R. § 20106.
Train operating speed is governed by 49 C.F.R. § 213.9(a) which expressly states die
applicable speeds on certain grades of railroad track. These speeds are set according to die track's
class, ranging from one (1) to six (6). CSX maintains that the track at DeLauney Street crossing was
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rated as a class four (4) track which has a speed range of 60-90 M.P.H. Franklin avers that the train
was traveling at the rate of 42 M.P.H. prior to the accident. (Def.'s Partial Summ. J. Mot., Exh. A.)
The evidence before die Court establishes that die CSX train was traveling within die established
federal standards at the time of the incident which is die subject of this suit.
In diis case, die plaintiff claims that the train should have slowed in response to an alleged local
safety hazard. According to Thompson, die bent and nonreflecorized crossbucks allegedly present at
die DeLauney Street crossing constituted a local safety hazard to which die train crew should have
responded by slowing the train's speed at that crossing. (PL's Resp., p. 4.) A specific local safety
hazard must be a condition so unusual that the Secretary could not have considered such in making a
determination of train speed limits under die FRSA, as in the case in which an engineer sets a motorist
stranded on die tracks, but fails to stop or slow to avoid die collision. O'Bannon v. Union Pac. R.R.,
960 F. Supp. 1411, 1420-21 (W.D. Mo. 1997); Herriman v. Conrail, Inc., 883 F. Supp. 303, 307
(N.D. Ind. 1995).
Defects such as those named by Thompson are not the type of individualized hazard envisioned
by the Easterwood court and section 20106 to qualify under die savings clause. In fact, these types of
defects were accounted for within the regulations governing maximum operational speeds at the outset.
See Armstrong v. Atchison, Topeka, & Santa Fe R.R., 844 F. Supp. 1152, 1153 (W.D. Tex. 1994); .
The Court thus finds that the second savings clause does not preserve the plaintiffs' claim of
excessive train speed. The Court notes that although the plaintiffs' claim of excessive speed is
preempted, evidence of the train's speed is relevant to other issues in the case and can be used in proof
of those matters. See Easterwood v. CSX Transp., Inc., 933 F.2d 1548, 1553 n.9 (11th Cir. 1991),
affd, 507 U.S. 658 (1993); Watson v. RailLink, Inc., 826 F. Supp. 487, 490 n.l (S.D. Ga. 1993);
O'Bannon. 960 F. Supp. at 1420.
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^adequate Warnings
CSX contends that it is entitled to partial summary judgment on Thompson's claims that CSX

had a duty to erect or design additional warning devices aside from those already present at the
DeLauney Street crossing. (Def.'s Summ. J. Mot., p. 2.) As previously stated, this claim is also
governed by Easterwood.

In that case, the United States Supreme Court offered guidance regarding

the preemptive effect of 23 C.F.R. §§ 646.214(b)(3) and (4), which provide that certain warning
devices be installed, or federal approval obtained, for particular crossing projects. Easterwood, 507
U.S. at 670-72; Bowman v. Norfolk S. R.R., 832 F. Supp. 1014, 1019 (D. S.C. 1993); Eldridge v.
Missouri Pac. R.R., 832 F. Supp. 328, 331 (E.D. Okla. 1993).
The regulations anticipate railroad participation in the determination of die appropriate grade
crossing warning devices used at a particular crossing, through their participation in diagnostic teams
which may or may not recommend the use of crossing gates. Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 670. When the
railroad has participated in such an effort, the issue of the adequacy of grade crossing warning devices
is preempted by federal law. Easterwood, 507 U.S. at 670; Hester v. CSX Trans., Inc., 61 F.3d 382,
387 (5th Cir. 1995), cert, denied 516 U.S. 1093 (1996); Michael v. Norfolk S. R.R., 74 F.3d 271, 273
n. 3.
CSX has established that federal funds were used to install an inventory marker and a multiple
track warning sign along with advanced warning signs, and white pavement markings at the DeLauney
Street crossing. (Def.'s Summ. J. Mot., Exhs. C-G; PL's Resp., Exh. A, McCormick Depo., pp. 8,
10.) Defendant asserts that the use of federal fiinds to install the reflectorized crossbucks and pavement
markings triggers the preemption provisions of the C.F.R. sections mentioned above.
The Court determines from the available evidence that die railroad participated in a decision
regarding the adequacy of die grade crossing warning system at die DeLauney Street crossing.

Hester,

61 F.3d at 387; Woods v. Amtrak, 982 F. Supp. 409, 411-13 (N.D. Miss. 1997). The defendant has

7
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shown that federal funds were used in the installation of the passive warning devices at the DeLauney
Street crossing. Accordingly, the Court finds that the defendant's motion regarding the plaintiffs
inadequate warnings claim should be granted. Williams v. CSX Trans., Inc., 925 F. Supp. 447 (S.D.
Miss. 1996).
Plaintiff argues the signalization claim is not entirely preempted, however, due to failure to
provide adequate maintenance at the track. (PL's Resp., p. 4.) A warning device that is no longer
operational would not be preempted under the regulations, particularly if there is evidence that the
warning device does not comply with federal regulations. Michael, 74 F.3d at 273. The Court
concludes that Thompson's contenaon regarding the alleged maintenance of the warning devices at the
crossing is not preempted. See Kiemele v. Soo Line R.R., 93 F.3d 472, 475 (8th Cir. 1996). As a
result, the Court finds that defendant's motion for partial summary judgment concerning the grade
crossing warning devices should be granted in pan and denied in part. The Court finds that CSX's
motion for partial summary judgment based on die preemption of the adequacy of the warning devices
at the crossing should be granted. Preemption does not, however, apply to plaintiffs claims regarding
the maintenance of the grade crossing warning devices, and accordingly, the Court finds that CSX's
motion for partial summary judgment on the maintenance of the warning devices should be denied.
Conclusion
Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the defendant's motion for partial summary
judgment should be granted in part and denied in part. CSX's motion for partial summary judgment
relating, to plaintiffs negligence claims regarding the train's speed in excess of track limits should be
granted. In addition, plaintiffs claim regarding any need for additional or different grade crossing
warning devices is preempted under federal law, therefore the defendant's motion for partial summary
judgment on this claim should be granted. CSX's motion for partial summary judgment on plaintiffs
claim concerning the maintenance of the warning devices, however, should be denied. A separate
8
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Partial Summary Judgment in conformity with and incorporating by reference the foregoing
Memorandum Opinion shall issue this date. Each party shall their respective costs in connection with
this motion.
DATED this the 14th day of September, A.D., 1998.
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1998 U.S. Dist LEXIS 14576, * ; 14 BNA IER CAS 936
UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION and BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS versus
MICHAEL FOSTER, as Governor of the State of Louisiana and RICHARD IEYOUB, as Attorney
General of the State of Louisiana
CIVIL ACTION No. 98-2443 SECTION: E/5
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF LOUISIANA
1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14576; 14 BNA IER CAS 936

September 9, 1998, Decided
September 9, 1998, Filed, Entered
DISPOSITION: [*1] Motions of plaintiffs United Transportation Union and Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers, and of intervenor, Association of American Railroads, for a preliminary
injunction GRANTED.
CORE TERMS: regulation, railroad, locomotive, state law, testing, recorder, train, engineer,
crossing, Fourth Amendment, preliminary injunction, federal law, interstate commerce,
pre-emption, toxicological, audible, alcohol, hazard, subject matter, warning, federal regulation,
probable cause, prescribe, highway, Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act, reasonable suspicion, law
enforcement officer, locomotive engine, pre-empted, equipping
COUNSEL: For UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION, BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS,
plaintiffs: Blake G. Arata, Jr., Benjamin B. Saunders, Davis, Saunders, Arata & Rome, Metairie, LA.
For UNITED TRANSPORTATION UNION, BROTHERHOOD OF LOCOMOTIVE ENGINEERS, plaintiffs:
Lawrence M. Mann, Alper & Mann, Washington, DC.
For ASSOCIATION OF AMERICAN RAILROADS, intervenor-plaintiff: Patrick A. Talley, Jr., Michael
Raudon Phillips, Frilot, Partridge, Kohnke & Clements, LC, New Orleans, LA.
JUDGES: MARCEL LIVAUDAIS, JR., United States District Judge.
OPINIONBY: MARCEL LIVAUDAIS, JR.
OPINION: ORDER AND REASONS
Plaintiffs, United Transportation Union and Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers ("the Unions")
have filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief to enjoin enforcement of three statutes
recently passed by the Louisiana State Legislature, namely, Louisiana Senate Bill No. 26, which
enacts La. R.S. 32:661.2, requiring toxicological testing of railroad crews involved in collisions at
nailroad crossings, Louisiana [*2] Senate Bill No. 30, which amends and reenacts La. R.S.
32:168, requiring the equipping of locomotives with audible signaling devices and requiring audible
signaling by train operators when approaching railroad highway crossings, and Senate Bill No. 100,
which enacts La. R.S. 32:176, requiring notification to state law enforcement officers if the train
possesses an event recorder and also requiring the furnishing of the information contained on the
recorder after railroad accidents at railroad highway crossings to state law enforcement officers.
Plaintiffs contend that the statutes must be enjoined and seek a declaration that these three
statutes violate the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution because they impose an
undue burden on interstate commerce and that they are preempted by federal law pursuant to the
Supremacy Clause of the Constitution. In conjunction therewith, plaintiffs submitted a request for a
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temporary restraining order and an application for a preliminary injunction. The Court granted the
temporary restraining order. The Association of American Railroads moved for leave to intervene as
plaintiff, which was granted as no party objected to the intervention. [*3]

I

{

A hearing on the preliminary injunction was scheduled and conducted and oral argument was
granted to plaintiffs, intervenor, and defendant, the State of Louisiana. The State, who appeared
for Michael Foster, as Governor of the State of Louisiana, and for Richard Ieyoub, as Attorney
General of the State of Louisiana, opposes the entry of a preliminary injunction.
The fundamental basis of this action arises from the uniformity of regulation provision of the
Federal Railroad Safety Act ("FRSA"), 49 U.S.C. 5 20106, which provides:

^

Laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad safety shall be nationally uniform to
the extent practicable. A State may adopt or continue in force a law, regulation, or
order related to railroad safety until the Secretary of Transportation prescribes a
regulation or issues an order covering the subject matter of the State requirement A
State may adopt or continue in force an additional or more stringent law, regulation, or
order related to railroad safety when the law, regulation, or order—
(1) is necessary to eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard;
(2) is not incompatible with a law, regulation, or order of the United States
[*4] Government; and
(3) does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce.
The plaintiffs contend that the challenged statutes are preempted by this FRSA, that Senate Bill
30, La. R.S. 32:168, is preempted by the Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act, as amended, 49 U.S.C.
5 20701, et seq, and that two of the state laws are unconstitutional as they burden interstate
commerce in violation of the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution. The plaintiffs also
contend that La. R.S. 32:661.2 offends the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution,
as extended to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment
The Supreme Court in Louisiana Public Service Commission v. F.C.C., 476 U.S. 355, 106 S. Ct.
1890, 90 L. Ed. 2d 369 (1986). discussed the effect of the Supremacy Clause on state laws which
relate to federal laws and regulations on the same subject, observing:

I

The Supremacy Clause of Art. VI of the Constitution provides Congress with the power
to pre-empt state law. Pre-emption occurs when Congress, in enacting a federal
statute, expresses a clear intent to pre-empt state law, when there is outright or actual
conflict between federal and state law, where compliance [*5] with both federal and
state law is in effect physically impossible, where there is implicit in federal law a
barrier to state regulation, where Congress has legislated comprehensively, thus
occupying an entire field of regulation and leaving no room for the States to
supplement federal law, or where the state law stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment and execution of the full objectives of Congress. Pre-emption may
result not only from action taken by Congress itself; a federal agency acting within the
scope of its congressionally delegated authority may pre-empt state regulation. . . .
The critical question in any pre-emption analysis is always whether Congress intended
that federal regulation supersede state law.

[citations omitted]; Louisiana Public Service Commission, 106 S. Ct. at 1898-99.
The Supreme Court in CSX Transportation. Inc. v. Easterwood. 507 U.S. 658, 113 S. Ct. 1732, 123
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L Ed. 2d 387 (19931 explained the process by which a determination is made whether a state law
is preempted by the FRSA, stating:
Where a state statute conflicts with, or frustrates, federal law, the former must give
way. U.S. Const., Art. VI, cl. 2; Maryland v. Louisiana. f*61 451 U.S. 725, 746, 101
S. Ct. 2114, 2128, 68 L Ed. 2d 576 (1981V In the interest of avoiding unintended
encroachment on the authority of the States, however, a court interpreting a federal
statute pertaining to a subject traditionally governed by state law will be reluctant to
find pre-emption. Thus, pre-emption will not lie unless it is "the clear and manifest
purpose of Congress." Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp.. 331 U.S. 218, 230, 67 S. Ct.
1146, 1152, 91 L. Ed. 1447 (1947). Evidence of pre-emptive purpose is sought in the
text and structure of the statute at issue. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85,
95, 103 S. Ct. 2890, 2898. 77 L Ed. 2d 490 (1983). If the statute contains an express
pre-emption clause, the task of statutory construction must in the first instance focus
on the plain wording of the clause, which necessarily contains the best evidence of
Congress' preemptive intent.
According to [the pertinent provision of the FRSA], applicable federal regulations may
pre-empt any state "law, rule, regulation, order, or standard relating to railroad
safety." Legal duties imposed on railroads by the common law fall within the scope of
these broad phrases. [Citation [*7] omitted] Thus, the issue before the Court is
whether the Secretary of Transportation has issued regulations covering the same
subject matter as Georgia negligence law pertaining to the maintenance of, and the
operation of trains at, grade crossings. To prevail on the claim that the regulations
have pre-emptive effect, petitioner must establish more than they "touch upon" or
"relate to" that subject matter, cf. Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374,
383-384, 112 S. Ct. 2031. 2037, 119 L Ed. 2d 157 (1992)(statutP's use of "relating
to" confers broad pre-emptive effect), for "covering" is a more restrictive term which
indicates that preemption will lie only if the federal regulations substantially subsume
the subject matter of the relevant state law. See Webster's Third New International
Dictionary 524 (1961) (in the phrase "policy clauses covering the situation," cover
means "to comprise, include, or embrace in an effective scope of treatment or
operation"). The term "covering" is in turn employed within a provision that displays
considerable solicitude for state law in that its express pre-emptions clause is both
prefaced and succeeded by express savings clauses. [*8]

CSXTransp., 113 S. Ct. at 1737-38.
The FRSA itself plainly states that "laws, regulations, and orders related to railroad safety shall be
nationally uniform to the extent practicable," allowing the states to pass their own laws on this
subject only in these circumstances: (1) until the Secretary of Transportation prescribes a
regulation or issues an order on that subject; (2) when the law, regulation or order "is necessary to
eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard"; (3) when the law, regulation or order "is
not incompatible with a law, regulation or order" of the federal government; and (4) when the
order does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce. Thus, the statute contains savings
clauses for states to pass their own regulations and laws only until the federal government
^idresses the issue and after that, only if it addresses essentially a local hazard, doesn't conflict
with federal law on the same subject, and doesn't burden interstate commerce. Creating a uniform
national law on railroad regulations allows the railroads to cross state lines regularly and in the
normal course of business without having to constantly alter or adapt to the laws [*9] of each
individual state, and without being in peril of offending those laws.
With these general pre-emption principles in mind, each individual statute adopted shall be
considered.
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Senate Bill No. 26, La. R.S. 32:661.2
Toxicological Testing
Senate Bill 26, as enacted as La. R.S. 32:661.2, which was signed into law by the Governor of the
State of Louisiana on May 6, 1998, concerns the toxicological testing of locomotive engineers. It
provides as follows in relevant part:

A.(l) Any person who operates a locomotive engine upon the railroad tracks of this
state shall be deemed to have given consent, subject to the provision of R.S. 32:662,
to a chemical test or tests of his blood, breach, urine, or other bodily substances for
the purpose of determining the alcoholic content of his blood and the presence of any
abused or illegal controlled dangerous substances as set forth in R.S. 40:964 in his
blood if he is involved in a collision at a railroad crossing at any roadway of this state
alleged to have occurred when he was driving or in actual physical control of the
locomotive engine while believed to be under the influence of alcoholic beverage or of
any abused or illegal [*10] controlled dangerous substance as set forth in R.S.
40:964.

(2) The test or tests shall be administered at the direction of the law
enforcement officer having reasonable grounds to believe the person to
have been operating or in physical control of the locomotive engine while
under the influence of either alcoholic beverages or any abused or illegal
controlled dangerous substance as set forth in R.S. 40:964. The law
enforcement agency by which such officer is employed shall designate
which of the aforesaid tests shall be administered.
The Unions allege that this statute is pre-empted by federal law, as the Federal Railroad
Administration ("FRA") has completely and substantially subsumed the subject matter of alcohol
and drug testing in the railroad industry, and that it offends the Fourth Amendment. In relation to
the pre-emption issue, the FRA has issued regulations, contained in 49 C.F.R. Part 219, which
concern the use and possession of alcohol and controlled substances by railroad employees. 49
C.F.R. § 219.201 details the circumstances under which mandatory post-accident toxicological
testing is required, which includes a (1) major train accident, i.e., any train [*11] accident
involving damage of more than $ 6,600 in 1998; (2) a reportable injury; (3) a fatality to any
on-duty railroad employee; or (4) a passenger train accident causing a reportable injury to a
passenger. However, the FRA promulgated regulations except the railroad employees from testing
"in the case of a collision between railroad rolling stock and a motor vehicle or other highway
conveyance at a rail/highway grade crossing." 49 C.F.R. § 219.201(b).
The basis for the Fourth Amendment challenge is that the statute allows mandatory toxicological
testing of railroad employees' blood, breath, urine, or other bodily substance, if the employee is
involved in a collision while he was driving or in actual physical control of the locomotive engine
and the law enforcement officer has "reasonable grounds to believe" that the engineer was
operating the locomotive while under the influence of alcohol or illegal controlled substances. The
Unions argue that the "reasonable grounds to believe" standard is less than the probable cause
requirement contained in the Fourth Amendment, as applied to the states in the Fourteenth
Amendment.
As noted by the Supreme Court in Skinner v. Railway Labor f*121 Executives' Association, 489
U.S. 602, 109 S. Ct. 1402. 103 L. Ed. 2d 639 (1989), the FRA promulgated detailed and specific
regulations addressing the problem of alcohol and drug use by railroad employees, which, among
other things, prohibit employees from reporting to work while under the influence of, or impaired
by, alcohol, while having a blood alcohol concentration of .04 or more, or while under the influence
of, or impaired by, any controlled substance. 109 S. Ct. at 1408, citing 49 C.F.R. § 219.101(a)(2).
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Subpart C, which is mandatory, requires post-accident toxicological testing, under the
circumstances previously stated, and Subpart D, which is permissive, requires covered employees
to submit to breath or urine tests where there is a "reasonable suspicion" that the employee's acts
or omissions may have contributed to an accident, in the event of specific rule violations, such as
excessive speeding, or when a supervisor has "reasonable suspicion" that an employee is under the
influence of alcohol, based upon specific, personal observations concerning appearance, behavior,
speech or body odors of the employee. 109 S. Ct. at 1410.
These regulations provide for administrative [*13] "searches" of the employees' blood and urine
under specific circumstances stated in a detailed plan. The purpose for such testing, as described
by the Skinner Court, is "'to prevent accidents and casualties that result from impairment of
employees by alcohol or drugs'", not to assist in the prosecution of employees. 109 S. Ct. at 1415.
By contrast, the predominant purpose of Louisiana Senate Bill 26, La. R.S. 32:661.2, is to aid state
law enforcement officers in the criminal prosecution of locomotive engineers. As such, the statute
allows the law enforcement officers to "search" the bodily fluids of the locomotive engineers based
upon a reasonable suspicion, which does not rise to the level of "probable cause" mandated by the
Fourth Amendment. 50 Fed. Reg. 31565 (Aug. 2, 1985); See, Tamez v. City of San Marcos, Texas.
118 F.3d 1085, 1093 (5th Cir. 1997): Fields v. City of South Houston, Texas, 922 F.2d 1183, 1189
(5th Cir. 1991).
The detailed federal regulations adopted by the FRA provide an administrative scheme by which
the federal government seeks to prevent alcohol and illegal drug use by railroad engineers and
thus enhance the safety of railroad operations, designed [*14] to aid not only railroad passengers
and motorists and pedestrians at crossings, but railroad employees and those having an interest in
cargo being carried by the railroad. The primary purpose of the administrative regulations is to
deter "employees engaged in safety-sensitive tasks from using controlled substances or alcohol in
the first place". Skinner, 109 S. Ct. at 1420. While such testing may also aid in criminal
prosecution, such is not the primary objective of the regulations.
By contrast, the predominant, if not the sole, purpose of the Louisiana statute at issue requiring
toxicological testing of railroad engineers following an accident is to aid in criminal prosecution of
these individuals. The fact that such testing is allowed on the basis of a "reasonable suspicion",
which is "a test clearly short of traditional criminal probable cause," conflicts with Fourth
Amendment guarantees. 50 Fed. Reg. 31508-01. The Unions concede that if the statute allowed
drug and alcohol testing on the basis of the law enforcement officer having probable cause to
believe the engineer was operating the locomotive while under the influence, they would not have
a Fourth Amendment challenge. [*15] Neither the plaintiffs, nor this Court, nor the State, can
rewrite the statute so that it will comport with constitutional dictates, however. Only the legislature
can legislate.
The State contends that the Act is not pre-empted by federal law and that its purpose is to give
state law enforcement officials investigating a rail crossing accident the power to administer
chemical tests to the operators of trains to determine the presence of alcohol and drugs in the
operators and to add the operator of a locomotive train to the group of persons who have given
implied consent to chemical tests. This argument, like the statute, while well-intentioned, ignores
the plethora of federal regulations governing the administration of such tests to railroad
employees. The federal regulatory scheme for administering such tests in accident situations is
^)ecific as to circumstances and how the testing is to be carried out. If the state had probable
cause to believe that one of its criminal statutes had been violated, then state law enforcement
officials could certainly enforce such statutes. See, e.g., Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757,
770, 86 S. Ct. 1826, 1835, 16 L Ed. 2d 908 (1966) [*16] (Supreme Court found that chemical
testing without the actual consent of the individual suspected of driving while intoxicated is
constitutional, where such is done with probable cause and in a reasonable manner). The Act in
question affords state law enforcement officials the right to administer chemical tests using a
"reasonable suspicion" test, which is less than the Fourth Amendment guarantees for a state
mandated search to enforce criminal laws.
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Given the complexity and specificity of the federal administrative regulations in the area of
toxicological testing of railroad employees, the Court finds that federal regulations have
substantially subsumed this particular area pursuant to the FRSA as evidenced by 49 C.F.R. Part
219. Senate Bill 26, La. R.S. 32:661.2, has been pre-empted by the FRSA and related federal
regulations.

.
*

Further, for the reasons previously stated, the Court also finds that the statute at issue does not
comport with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution, as
applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.
(
Senate Bill No. 30, La. R.S. 32:168
Audible Signalling Devices
Senate Bill No. 30, which amends and [*17]
March, 1999, provides in relevant part:

reenacts La. R.S. 32:168, and becomes effective in

A. Every railroad company or person owning and operating a railroad in this state shall
equip each locomotive engine with a bell and whistle or horn which, under normal
conditions, can be heard at a distance of not less than one quarter mile.
B. Except as specifically exempted by law, any person controlling the motion of an
engine on any railroad shall commence sounding the audible signal when such engine
is approaching and not less than one quarter of a mile from the place where such
railroad crosses any highway. Such sounding shall be prolonged either continuously or
by blasts of the whistle or horn to be sounded in the manner provided by the Uniform
Code of Railroad Operating Rules until the engine has crossed the roadway, unless the
distance from that crossing and the start of the movement or the distance between the
crossings is less than one quarter mile, in which event such warning signals shall be so
sounded for the lesser distance. In cases of emergency said whistles or horn may be
sounded in repeated short blasts.

<

<

The Unions seek a preliminary injunction prohibiting [*18] the enforcement of this statute on the
grounds that it prescribes a regulation in an area which has been subsumed by federal laws and
regulations, i.e., 49 C.F.R. Part 229, it burdens interstate commerce, and it is clearly precluded by
the Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act, as amended, 49 U.S.C 5§ 20701-20703. The State admits
that Senate Bill 30 [Act 83, enacted as La. R.S. 32:168] covers the same subject matter as 49
U.S.C. S 20153 and 49 C.F.R § 229.129. The State suggests, however, that under the FRSA,
savings clauses allow a state to legislate in an area of federal regulation if (1) it is necessary to
eliminate or reduce an essentially local safety hazard; (2) it is not incompatible with a federal law,
regulation, or order; and (3) it does not unreasonably burden interstate commerce. The
defendants1 position is that this Act meets these requirements.
Under regulations promulgated by the FRA, "each lead locomotive shall be provided with an
audible warning device that produces a minimum sound level of 96db(A) [decibels] at 100 feet
forward of the locomotive in its direction of travel. The device shall be arranged so that it can be
conveniently operated from the engineer's [*19] normal position in the cab." 49 C.F.R. §
z29.129. The Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act, 49 U.S.C. 5 20702, requires all locomotives to be
in compliance with all regulations prescribed by the Secretary, including specifically to contain all
parts and appurtenances, such as audible warning devices, required by the applicable Code of
Federal Regulations. The Swift Rail Development Act of 1994, 49 U.S.C. S 20153, mandates that
the Secretary of Transportation prescribe "regulations requiring that a locomotive horn shall be
sounded while each train is approaching and entering upon each public highway-rail grade
crossing." It is evident that the area of audible warning devices and the sounding of such devices
at rail-highway crossings are areas of specific federal regulation.
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More than seventy years ago, the United States Supreme Court held in Napier v. Atlantic Coast
Line R. Co., 272 U.S. 605. 47 S. Ct. 207. 71 L. Ed. 432 (1926), that in the area of the equipping of
locomotive engines, Congress intended the Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act to occupy the field,
such that the federal regulations "must prevail [and] requirements by the states are precluded,
however commendable or [*20] however different their purpose." 47 S. Ct. at 209-210. The
Locomotive Boiler Inspection Act continues to occupy the field of the regulation of locomotive
equipment. Missouri Pacific R. Co. v. Railroad Com'n of Texas, 833 F.2d 570, 576 and 576 n. 7 (5th
Or. 1987); Missouri Pacific R. Co. V. Railroad Com'n of Texas, 948 F.2d 179, 186 (5th Cir. 1991).
In fact, the Ninth Circuit in Marshall v. Burlington Northern, Inc., 720 F.2d 1149, 1153 (9th Cir.
1983), found that the Federal Railroad Safety Act indicated the intent of Congress "to leave the
Boiler Inspection Act intact, including its preemptive effect." Id.
While acknowledging the extensive federal regulations in the area of audible warning devices and
their signalling, e.g., 49 C.F.R. § 20153, the State contends that these regulations do not offend
the FRSA because they address an essentially local hazard and do not unreasonably burden
interstate commerce. An essentially local hazard concerns a particular crossing in a locality, not a
state-wide hazard, else the statute would have so many exceptions it would be rendered
meaningless. Allowing each state to prescribe its own regulations concerning the equipping of
[*21] locomotives would burden interstate commerce, as each train would have to stop at state
boundaries and change, add, or delete its equipment, depending upon that state's regulation.
These are the concerns which the Locomotive Boiler Act and the FRSA intended to address.
Upon reviewing the authorities concluding that federal regulation occupies the field of equipping of
locomotives, there is no doubt that state laws on the same subject are pre-empted. For the same
reasons, state regulations concerning the sounding of audible warning devices at highway
crossings are likewise pre-empted by federal regulations and statutes.
Senate Bill No. 100, La. R.S. 32:176
Recording Devices
Senate Bill No. 100, enacting La. R.S. 32:176, provides in relevant part:

Immediately following a railroad crossing accident, the engineer or a responsible
member of the crew, if the engineer is unable to provide the information, shall inform
the law enforcement officer investigating such accident if the train possesses an event
recorder which records and preserves any information which is relevant to the accident
or may be of assistance in the investigation of the accident. Upon request of the law
[*22] enforcement officer, the railroad or its representative shall provide, in a timely
manner, any such information contained on the event recorder whose release is not
prohibited by federal law, rule or regulation.
Like the areas of toxicological testing of railroad engineers and audible warning devices, the
equipping of trains with event recorders [i.e, "black boxes"], is the subject of extensive federal
regulation. 49 U.S.C. 5 20137 defines the term "event recorder" as a device that "(1) records train
speed, hot box detection, throttle position, brake application, brake operations, and any other
function the Secretary of Transportation considers necessary to record to assist in monitoring the
safety of train operation, such as time and signal indication; and (2) is designed to resist
tampering." Section 30137 requires that the Secretary of Transportation prescribe regulations
requiring that a train be equipped with an event recorder within a specified time period. Such
regulations were promulgated in 49 C.F.R. Part 229. 49 C.F.R. § 229.25 mandates that event
recorders be tested and lists parameters for such testing. 49 C.F.R. § 135 dictates that event
recorders be installed [*23] on any train operated faster than 30 miles per hour and dictates how
the locomotive is to respond to defective equipment, how the event recorder may be removed from
service, and requires that the railroad preserve the data contained on the recorder and provide it
to the FRA or the National Transportation Safety Board in the event of an accident. The regulation
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also specifically provides:

Nothing in this section is intended to alter the legal authority of law enforcement
officials investigating potential violationfs] of State criminal law[s] and nothing in this
chapter is intended to alter in any way the priority of National Transportation Safety
Board investigations . . ., nor the authority of the Secretary of Transportation to
investigate railroad accidents . . . .

49C.F.R. § 229.135.
These federal regulations require locomotives to be equipped with event recorders and to furnish
the information to specified federal authorities, in certain delineated situations. Further, it allows
states to obtain the information on the recorders in the enforcement of their criminal laws. As
such, event recorders are an area of federal regulation in which the state has also [*24] sought
to regulate. The states already possess the authority to enforce their criminal laws and to
subpoena such information as is necessary to aid in their criminal investigations. This statute does
not fall into the savings provisions of the FRSA because it does not address an essentially local
hazard and it concerns the same area as extensive federal regulations. Considering the wealth of
regulations in this area, federal law has subsumed the subject matter of event recorders and
pre-empts Senate Bill No. 100, La. R.S. 32:176.
Standards for Issuing a Preliminary Injunction
The Fifth Circuit has established the following requirements which the plaintiff must establish in
order to be entitled to preliminary injunctive relief: (1) a substantial likelihood of success on the
merits; (2) a substantial threat that irreparable injury will result if the injunction is not granted;
(3) the threatened injury outweighs the threatened harm to the defendant; and (4) granting the
preliminary injunction will not disserve the public interest. Mississippi Power & Light v. United Gas
Pipe Line, 760 F.2d 618. 621 f5th Cir. 1985); Trans World Airlines. Inc. V. Mattox, 897 F.2d 773.
783 f*251 f5th Cir. 1990): Doe v. Duncanviile Independent School District, 994 F.2d 160, 163
(5th Cir, 1993). A district court's decision whether to grant or deny a preliminary injunction will be
reviewed only upon a showing of abuse of discretion. Doe, 994 F.2d at 163: M.P.&L., 760 F.2d at
621.
The Unions must establish these four prerequisites in order to obtain preliminary injunctive relief.
This Court has already entered a temporary restraining order in their favor pursuant to Rule 65(b)
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The Court finds that there is a substantial likelihood that
the plaintiffs will prevail on the merits, for the reasons previously stated. Federal regulations have
substantially subsumed the areas addressed by the three state statutes in question, and the
toxicological testing requirement offends the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution. The Court
also finds that there is a threat of irreparable injury, as railroad employees could be subject to
chemical testing in violation of their constitutional rights and the railroads will have to alter their
"whistle posts", i.e., the posts that advise the engineers when to sound their whistles, to meet the
state [*26] requirements, which differ somewhat from the federal requirements. The threatened
injury outweighs the harm to the state, as the violation of the engineers' constitutional rights is a
^erious harm. Finally, the Court finds no disservice to the public interest, as there are extensive
federal regulations in the areas addressed by the state statutes which will protect the public and
are designed to increase railroad safety. Thus, the four requirements for the entry of a preliminary
injunction are met.
Conclusion
For the above and foregoing reasons, the Court finds that the plaintiffs and intervenor have
established their entitlement to the entry of a preliminary injunction. Accordingly,
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IT IS ORDERED that the motions of plaintiffs United Transportation Union and Brotherhood of
Locomotive Engineers, and of intervenor, Association of American Railroads, for a preliminary
injunction be and are hereby GRANTED.
New Orleans, Louisiana, September 9, 1998.
MARCEL LIVAUDAIS, JR.
United States District Judge
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